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Abstract
Chapter 1: Default and Punishment with Systemic Risk
This essay identifies substituting behaviors in an ex-ante financial system with
cyclical default/feedback leading to potential breakdown. Here, firms in a debt net-
work estimate potential default and as such, makes storage decision in order to avoid
defaulting. They make these decision due to the potential damages associated with
defaults. In doing so, firms optimize their savings strategy given their network/neigh-
borhood effect. We observe properties and existence of a Nash equilibrium under
instances where such ex-ante breakdown are caused in part by each owing firm.
Equilibrium storage is dominated by the fraction of default not attributed to conta-
gion. We also see a link between firms position in a default network and its storage.
As a policy tool, equilibrium under harsh punishment are also socially efficient in
achieving minimal default and systemic breakdown.
Chapter 2: Frictions in Financial Networks
This essay models transaction cost within an Eisenberg and Noe (2001) clear-
ing system and identifies such clearing properties such as existence, uniqueness and
methods of clearing. Further more, it adapts such transaction cost for decision mak-
ing into the Demange (2016)’s threat index with default feedback and observes the
behavior of the index/centrality rankings of each under changing transaction costs.
We find under strict conditions, existential possibilities of switching in such rankings
for firms involved.
Chapter 3: Strategic Interactions in Financial Networks
This essay models interactions of firms in a pre-trading(fixed network of lend-
ing/borrowing) period whereby firms set fixed lending rates given loan management
cost. We show strategic substitution in the rate each firm sets and more fundamen-
tally, propose that the rates charged to debtors by a creditor firm is likened to results
from a private provision of public good in networks game. We then highlight spe-
cific core-periphery network properties in relation to interdependence and Nash rate
charged by firms. For welfare policies, we find neutrality of intervention policies that
create or reduce transaction cost and improvement based on policies that provide
administrative subsidies thus creating an avenue for cost effective resource transfer
policy. Lastly, we find significant relationship between a firms centrality measured
by weaker negative externality and welfare improvement due to such subsidy.
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Chapter 1
Default and Punishments with
Systemic Risk
1.1 Introduction
A reliably functioning financial system is one of the prominent goals monetary au-
thorities of economies around the world struggle to maintain. Numerous incidents
have left key players in the global financial sector at the brink of collapse or in
worse cases, a systemic failure for a certain period.1 There are however few excep-
tional cases in which early warning signals of such collapse spurred stakeholders to
proactive interventions thereby, managing to elude a major catastrophe. Primary
examples of market stabilisation through intervention by private firms include the
case of Panic of 1907 (New York) . As explained by Tallman, Moen, et al. (1990),
while signs of chaos were already looming on the streets of Manhattan, J.P Morgan,
one of the greatest bankers at the time, decided to gather the big banks and man-
age to persuade them into signing for funds release to avert a potential crises. It
was said that the amounts contributed was trivial in comparison to what the actual
1Popularly the 1930’s and 2008 financial crises.
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crises would have been. Also, another earlier incident with similar characteristics
was the Barings bank collapse (1890, London) which originated in Argentina but its
fear quickly escalated to other parts of the world.2 In this case, the Bank of England
was forced to lobby and succeeded in pulling in resources from numerous European
powers to salvage the British financial market. Finally another important case was
an incident with Long Term Capital Management (1998, New York) where, as Jorion
(2000) recounts, the President William McDonough managed to convince 15 banks
to bail out the Long-term Capital Management which had almost collapsed due to
the devaluation of the Russian Rubles among many other reasons.
We build a model within the clearing system proposed by Eisenberg and Noe
(2001) with a baseline model of systemic risk through default contagion. As a step for-
ward, we uniquely infuse punishments as means of enforcing redemption of promises.
These punishment vary directly to the default value of each firm which are treated
in isolation, Where firms are able to estimate these defaults reliably, we grant the
option of unlimited access to storage in order to avoid default. Our motivation links
to the fact that studies have shown that defaults are damaging to firms and has even
greater indirect consequences than its face value. Defaults and systemic breakdown
has been proven to be significantly detrimental to firms involved. An example of
cost linked to firms default can be found in the study carried out by Strebulaev and
Zhao (2011) . Here, they used large data sourced from Default Risk Service (DRS)
on firms that defaulted over 14 years in terms of observed prices of debt and equity.
They found cost to be on average, as high as 21.7% of the market value of assets.
Break down of these cost ranged from 14.7% for bond renegotiations to 30.5% for
bankruptcies. We however for ease modify these assumptions immensely as would
be explained in the next section. Studies like Glover (2016) carry out similar survey.
This work adapts financial networks contagion into a decision making model for
2see Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008).
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the purpose of extracting public good behaviors from games of substitute in networks.
This is so as to observe who(s) contributes to financial stability within a system and
possibly to what extent would they be required to. Intervention by stakeholders
which are not necessarily 3rd party regulators like the federal government can then
be said to be of importance especially when signs of failures are imminent. In a lot
of instances, it has been those private banks who have been convinced of possible
loss (in the event the crises is allowed to proceed) that end up making attempts to
help the situation. It has then been argued by some economists that the absence of
similar intervention in the 2007 lead to the 2007-2008 financial crisis which at the
end, still elicited interventions from the European powers to salvage failing economies
like Greece, Portugal, Spain and the likes since the Eurozone Crises. In the field of
behavioral financial economics, the agent based model have seen growth in not only
depth, but breath as it has extended to the dimension of looking at participants in
the financial system as interwoven networks whose interactions and activities has
huge impact on the overall performance of system.
We show existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium and its link to the first
wave default described in Eisenberg and Noe (2001). Equilibrium behavior of firms
arise from an interaction based on strategic substitution such that firms benefit from
storage decisions from their direct debtors. As such, equilibrium behavior are well
linked to those found in public good games works such as Bergstrom, Blume, and
Varian (1986), Bramoullé, Kranton, and D’Amours (2010), Allouch (2015), etc. Liq-
uidity provision in a fragile system has been identified as possessing public good
characteristics (Buiter, 2008). One which can be managed privately (by hoarding
inherently liquid assets). Furthermore, Buiter (2008) suggested it would not be so-
cially efficient for private banks and other financial institutions to hold liquid assets
on their balance sheets in amounts sufficient to tie them over when markets become
3
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disorderly3. This suggests the ability for banks and other financial institutions to
provide liquidity as a pubic good in the face of growing necessity. Also, we see a rela-
tionship between a firms position in a well bounded default network and the amount
to which it stores.
For welfare properties, our Nash equilibrium is Pareto efficient and maximum
social efficiency would be based on higher punishments. Lastly, we reveal instance
of substitution behavior and equilibrium outcome which may link to the first wave
default in instance where cost where convex to default amount of each firm. An intu-
ition from this links to the fact that stochastic defaults of a firm are not substituted
for and as such, when each firm focuses on covering for risk arising outside the net-
work, then the system becomes increasingly less fragile. This provides a link between
social optimality as firms individual choices ensures the stability in the system.
1.1.1 Related Literature
Financial networks and contagion has become an increasingly targeted topic for nu-
merous researches since the start of the 21st century. Especially since 2008 events.
This paper is built around the Eisenberg and Noe (2001) framework which set up a
standard networks bounded by existing obligations which clear at a particular pe-
riod. As its primary focus, clearing characteristics of the model was described while
various methods of computing for the clearing payment was proposed, most notably,
the fictitious default algorithm. This algorithm solves for the sequence by using a
Gauss elimination approach from a starting point that all firms in the network pre-
sumably pay in full. Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium was established under
mild conditions using fixed point theorems. One very important characteristic of this
model was the concept of Waves of Default where other firms might fall short be-
cause some other connecting firm fell short. While the proposed sequence is fictitious
3In essence, characteristics of a looming crises.
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in nature, intuitions can be very important for understanding contagion as well as
strategic interactions in such network which we explore in this work. Additionally,
the model gives us an initial insight into a prototype financial system financial system
in which defaults exhibit cyclical behaviors. The clearing algorithm is such that so
far as iterations stop in a total sequence less than the paying nodes, then systemic
risk is avoided. In a case that it runs above, then evidence of feedback and as such,
systemic risk is revealed.
As a modification to the Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Elsinger, Lehar, and Summer
(2006) famously explores networks where certain agents are deemed of greater impor-
tance to others. Similar to the baseline model,4 conditions for clearing and further
characteristics where established. Also possible hints for its computations. Building
further, Elliott, Golub, and Jackson (2014) explored strategic interaction and impact
of shocks to networks with a primary focus on the dilemma between integration, di-
versification and contagion. Some important results reached is one that points to the
inefficiency of networks due to high amount of one and lower amount of the other5.
One form of these shocks (as it relates to the concept of first wave default in our
model) can arise due to stochasticity of returns. Broadly, they are product of mar-
ket irregularities which might affect the cashflow of firms. They as such, constitute
the part of default which can arise to a firm outside his network interlinks. In the
network, they materialise as contagion. In the light of contagion, Amini, Filipović,
and Minca (2016) looked at interactions in an instance whereby firms facing default
are forced to liquidate some amount to cover up and these liquidation is inversely
proportional to the price of the assets so that the more assets, the lower its worth.
It explored equilibrium amount of liquidation. A more general setting of this work
was similarly covered by Feinstein (2017).
An important work on penalty in equilibrium analysis Dubey, Geanakoplos, and
4By baseline, we mean the Eisenberg and Noe (2001) model
5Integration or Diversification.
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Shubik (2005) who famously captured punishment in general equilibrium analysis.
Key assumptions of the model that we drift away from includes the notion that
punishment may or may not occur even in the event of default, also agents where
not aware of other agents commitments and as such, could not estimate a network.
These limited information gave room for adverse selection and moral hazards in the
network and also, punishment varied from contract to contract. Furthermore, we
see in Demange (2016) a statement on destructiveness of systems and the ability for
agents who cause such systemic risk to ignore the full effect of his actions on the
system and as such aim to free-ride the provision of others to guarantee stability. We
aim to, using our build up, to investigate into these kinds of behaviors. This links
to the fact that Defaults due to ability for contagion/cascade in networks brings in
characteristics of Public Goods. Public goods in networks with strategic interactions
have been famously captured by Bramoullé et al. (2010) while private provision
of such public goods was the focus of Allouch (2015). Best replies in both cases
exhibit linearity (corresponding to those in Bergstrom et al. (1986), Bramoullé et al.
(2010) , as well as Allouch (2015) to mention but a few) and also ability to free-ride
contributions depends on the level of influence (using reverse centrality measures
indicating vulnerability ) on the network which otherwise would have led to what
Allouch (2015) grouped as specialist and free riders. Uniquely in our model, best
replies indicate that all players end up being specialist such that complete free-riders
are avoided. Our equilibrium also reveals similar intuitions to components of the
best replies of a default game given in Allouch and Jalloul (2016). However there are
subtle differences as we discuss in subsequent sections.
6
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1.2 The Model
We consider a two period economy. First the initial period which we denote as 𝑡 = 0,
and then the payment period denoted as 𝑡 = 1 . Let 𝒩 = {1, . . . , 𝑛} be a set
which captures every firm that makes up the economy (nodes). At 𝑡 = 0, firms are
exogenously faced with existing promises of debt and repayment obligations to other
firms and we denote the total obligation every firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 has as 𝐿𝑖. For each firm
𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 , let its set of debtors and creditors be 𝒩𝑖 so that 𝒩𝑖 = {𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖 ∪𝒩 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 }.6 We
denote the total portion of firm 𝑖’s obligation that goes to firm 𝑗 as 𝐿𝑖𝑗 and the relative









𝑗∈𝒩 𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑔𝑖𝑗 = 1.
This is such that firm 𝑗 ∈ 𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖 if and only if 𝑔𝑗𝑖 > 0 and firm 𝑗 ∈ 𝒩 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 if and only
if 𝑔𝑖𝑗 > 0. Receiving as well as paying firms form a directed graph which we denote
as 𝐺(𝒩 , 𝑔) so that 𝒩 stands for the nodes(firms) while 𝑔 represents obligations
between 2 firms. The financial network graph 𝐺(𝒩 , 𝑔) is then captured using the
relative liability/obligation matrix given as 𝐺 = [𝑔𝑖𝑗] ∈ R𝑛×𝑛+ whose elements contain
relative obligations for each firm in the network. We allow the possibility for bilateral
obligations such that liabilities cannot be netted off each other.
Furthermore, we hold that each firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 , has an initial endowment which we
denote as 𝑦𝑖 at 𝑡 = 0 as well. The intuition as well as justification for this parameter
could be the concept of a Reserve Requirement in banking systems. The quality of
such endowment is that they are reserved solely for the purpose of meeting up with
obligations. They cannot be used for any other purpose. Let 𝜋𝑖 denote the parameter
firm 𝑖 pays given his obligation. This amount in turn is derived from the standard
6A firm 𝑖 is a debtor if and only if 𝒩 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 ̸= {} as in a creditor only when 𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖 ̸= {}.
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𝑔𝑗𝑖𝜋𝑗 + 𝑦𝑖, 𝐿𝑖
⎫⎬⎭ , (1.1)
with 𝜋𝑗 denoting the payment of a given firm 𝑗 of which 𝑔𝑗𝑖 > 0 and hence, is directly
connected to firm 𝑖. So in line with the standard framework, firms do not pay more
than what they owe. The limited liability principle holds so that firms who are unable
to meet fully their obligations split their assets among all creditor firms on pro-rata
(In essence, in the case of a firm 𝑖, 𝑔𝑖𝑗𝜋𝑗 is given to each firm 𝑗 ∈ 𝒩 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 ). Let 𝜋0𝑖 serve
as the amount firm 𝑖 pays given the parameters at 𝑡 = 0, and the expected default
estimable by the firm 𝑖 to be:
𝜗𝑖 = 𝐿𝑖 − 𝜋0𝑖 .




𝑗 + 𝑦𝑖, 𝐿𝑖
}︀
denotes the estimated payment at 𝑡 = 0.7
This model assumes that ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 , 𝜋0𝑖 is known with full certainty.8. In our model,
we assume that at 𝑡 = 0, 𝑦𝑖 captures the network endowment of firm 𝑖 and hence,
is not prone to any further shocks. Then given 𝜋0𝑖 the following definition becomes
relevant,
Definition 1.2.1. Firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 is a defaulter if 𝜗𝑖 > 0.
Then from the definition, let 𝒟 = {1, . . . , 𝑑} be a default set such that for any
𝑖 ∈ 𝒟, 𝜗𝑖 > 0, then we assume that punishment is applied to such firms using
the homogeneous functional form 𝜆𝑖(𝜗𝑖) which captures the rate of punishment from
default such that 𝜆𝑖(𝜗𝑖) is twice differentiable in 𝜗𝑖. As an integral part of our model,
we also have that 𝜆𝑖 = Λ for every 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟 such that punishment is applied in the
7The value 𝜋0𝑖 is notably the same as the initial stress used in Paddrik, Rajan, and Young (2020).
8This is a subtle divergence from the structure of most contagion literature such as Elliott et
al. (2014), Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015), Cabrales, Gottardi, and Vega-Redondo
(2014) or Blume, Easley, Kleinberg, Kleinberg, and Tardos (2011) for instance who all studied
networks where firms are susceptible to external shocks which could reduce their endowments (𝑦𝑖).
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Figure 1-1: Network with 3 firms and 4 debt contracts (edges)
Given payments and possible defaults, it is not necessarily the case that based on
𝜋0, all firms are defaulters. To further streamline our analysis, we focus our attention
to the following situation;
Assumption 1.2.1. For every firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 the following holds true
1. 𝒩 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 ̸= {},
2. 𝜋0𝑖 < 𝐿𝑖 so that Firm 𝑖 is a defaulter.
This implies that all firms have some financial obligation to which they estimate
to fall short based on period the parameters at 𝑡 = 0. We use the sets 𝒩 and 𝒟
interchangeably going forward. We grant in period 𝑡 = 0 each firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟 the capacity
to store an amount denoted as 𝑥𝑖 to reduce default cost given their current position
(𝜋0). Examples of such storage could include bank savings, vault cash set aside for
payment, investment in collateral assets whose value are easily recoverable, etc.
These storage decisions of each firm in the network are common knowledge to
every other firm in our economy. Another characteristics of 𝑥 is its irreversiblity as
firms are unable to retract their decision on storage once made. It is then possible
to view 𝜋0𝑖 as the output of fictitious default clearing mechanism at 𝑡 = 1 assuming
no further actions are taken by any firm in the network.
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Payment system characterization
In this part we group the clearing payment for each firm 𝑖 in 𝑡 = 1 accounting for
defaults and storage decisions in 𝑡 = 0. Let 𝛿𝑖 be an indicator variable that takes
value
𝛿𝑖 =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ 1 if firm 𝑖 is a defaulter, and0 otherwise.
Also, let 𝜋𝑥𝑖 be the payment of each firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟 in period 𝑡 = 1. Then, (1.1) can be
written as:
𝜋𝑥𝑖 = 𝛿𝑖





⎞⎠ + (1 − 𝛿𝑖)𝐿𝑖 ∀𝑖. (1.2)
The above equation then lets us group the inflow of a firm into those who can pay
in full given 𝑡 = 0 and those who cannot. The equality is guaranteed through limited
liability of the clearing payment 𝜋𝑖∈𝒩 . However, we know from assumption 1.2.1 that
for all firm 𝑖 for which 𝐿𝑖 > 0, then (1 − 𝛿𝑖) = 0. So consequently, we have the (1.2)
rewritten as below;






Let I = {0, 1}𝑛×𝑛 as an identity matrix, x = (𝑥𝑖)𝑖∈𝒩 ∈ R𝑛+ and y = (𝑦𝑖)𝑖∈𝒩 be
column vectors referring to total obligation, storage and initial-endowments of each
firm. Then we have the system in (1.3) given in vector form as follows;
𝜋𝑥 = x + y + 𝐺𝑇𝜋𝑥.
then collecting the like terms yields,
(I−𝐺𝑇 ) 𝜋𝑥 = x + y,
If the matrix (I − 𝐺𝑇 ) is invertible , then we have the clearing payment at period
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𝑡 = 1 then given as;
𝜋𝑥 = (I−𝐺𝑇 )−1 ∙ (x + y) (1.4)
For simplicity, let w be a square matrix such that w = [𝑤𝑗𝑖] ∈ R𝑑×𝑑+ := (I−𝐺𝑇 )−1
and 𝑤𝑖 = (𝑤𝑗𝑖)𝑗∈𝒩 ∈ R𝑑+ be the 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ row of the square matrix w. We can then
rewrite (1.4) as;
𝜋𝑥 = w ∙ (x + y),
so that for each firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟, we have
𝜋𝑥𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖 ∙ (x + y). (1.5)
Corresponding to graph theory, 𝑤𝑗𝑖 is the sum of the number of backward walks of
any length from 𝑖 to 𝑗 where each firm within the walk is a defaulter. We also hold
the following assumption in relation to the graphical properties of the defaulting set
stated as follows;
Definition 1.2.2. A network graph 𝒢(𝒩 , 𝑔) is strongly connected if for ev-
ery pair of firms {0, 𝑛} ⊂ 𝒟, there exist a closed directed walk (the sequence
0, 𝑔01, 1, 𝑔12, . . . , 𝑔𝑛−1,𝑛, 𝑛, 𝑔0,𝑛, 0) from 0 to 0.
As such we describe the structure of the default network as follows;
Assumption 1.2.2. The default network 𝐺𝑇 is strongly connected.
The nature of clearing system whereby it meets the assumption 1.2.2 limits the
network to one exhibiting systemic risk such that defaults feedback to a less than 1
degree to source and thus a negative feedback mechanism is present. We focus on
this network with strongly connected property for this paper as we aim to access
a system where default feeds back to its primary source as is a unique property of
systemic risk through contagion. The fig. 1-1 for example shows that 𝒟 = {𝑖, 𝑗} fits
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well into this description. To guarantee non-singluar matrix properties of 𝐺𝑇 , the
following lemma becomes important;
Lemma 1.2.1. Assume a default network 𝐺𝑇 which is strongly connected, in so far
as there exists 𝑖 /∈ 𝒩 such that
∑︀
𝑗∈𝒩 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖
𝑔𝑖𝑗 = 0 and
∑︀
𝑗∈𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖
𝑔𝑗𝑖 > 0 (a sink node),
then such default network is regular and as such w = (I − 𝐺𝑇 )−1 is definite, and
well defined with positive elements.
Proof. See Appendix for proof.
Regularity here follows Eisenberg and Noe (2001) which in context, sink nodes
guarantee that risk orbits are always a surplus set as it always has a non-zero equity.
Its impact is also similar to normality under Allouch (2015). In recalling some of the
key propositions of systemic risk in financial systems is the fact that firms face risk
not only from external activities it participates in, but also as a result of other firms
behaviors to which it is connected to and as such, we have chosen to focus on the
latter. Cascading default primarily comes from a source firm(s). These firms in the
network are said to have, among their total estimated default, a non-trivial portion
which coming exclusively from its outside activities rather than systemic.9 This is so
that while the Fictitious default sequence captures different waves of default among
firms in the network which is reflected in each iteration to arrive at the Clearing
Payment (𝜋0), that of the First-wave/First iteration reflects those who default from
non-systemic causes. In the light of that we can define the following term:




𝑔𝑗𝑖𝐿𝑗 − 𝑦𝑖 > 0.
Thus implying that within the estimates at 𝑡 = 0, firms who are first wave
defaulters fail to meet up their obligations even when they receive full payment from
9In this case, activities leading up to 𝑡 = 0.
12
1. Default and Punishments with Systemic Risk
debtors. On the other hand, these firms originate the default that then cascades
through the system (thus instigating other iterations/waves). The first-wave default
could come from multiple sources. They include;
1. Internal Sources: Administrative deficiency, Mismanagement of funds, set-
tlement for litigation, other managerial diseconomies of scale, etc.
2. External Sources: Market shocks leading to stochasticity of returns, natural
disasters, theft, etc.
The underlying point is that first-wave defaults are product of systematic risk or
unsystematic risk a debtor firm faces. To complement assumption 1.2.1 for the sake
of this model, the following assumption becomes relevant:
Assumption 1.2.3. ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 , firm 𝑖 is First-wave defaulter.
Magnitude of default amounts are allowed to vary as much among firms. What
is of importance with the assumption is that all firms with debt obligations are not
able to repay fully given they receive all they can from the network. This assump-
tion now guarantees strict non-negativity of 𝑥𝑖∈𝒟. These assumptions are crucial as
the first grantees default cyclicality but brings in mind questions as to normality.
The assumption 1.2.3 on the other hand ensures continuity of substitution which is
discussed in detail in the Appendix.
Additionally, an intuition behind 𝑤𝑖∈𝒟 as contained in (1.5) as the parameter
arises from the fact that when 𝐺𝑇 is strongly connected, then a firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝐷 has a
total default which includes 𝑤𝑖 times its first-wave default. Hence, default feedback
which Eisenberg and Noe (2001) describes as the instance where "a firm-A defaults
causing other firms to default, which then makes firm-A default even more". Other
literature captures such behaviors including Paddrik et al. (2020). This is within the
framework seen as an evidence of systemic crises.
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Payoff and Optimization Programme
Having described the payment and network structure, we then the punishment system
𝜆𝑖(𝜙𝑖) for each firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟 as the following payoff (cost) function:
𝐶𝑖(𝜋
𝑥
𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖) =
Λ
2
(𝐿𝑖 − 𝜋𝑥𝑖 )2 + 𝑥𝑖. (1.6)
The equation above then means that at 𝑡 = 1, the total size of punishment a firm
𝑖 ∈ 𝒟 bears is an increasing function of its default amount within the period. This
is split into to parts, the Benefit and Cost segments.
If we denote the Benefit firm 𝑖 gets from storing as 𝑏𝑖, then is 𝑏𝑖(𝑥𝑖) = −0.5Λ(𝐿𝑖−
𝜋𝑥𝑖 )
2. Therefore 𝑥𝑖 : 𝑥𝑖 → 𝑏𝑖 is so that 𝑏𝑖 is concave and continuously increasing in
𝑥𝑖. Our hypothesis here is that firms get more from storing while total default is
still significant.10 This relationship arises from the intuition that large amount of
defaults become even more pronounced and as such attract greater consequences
including fall in reputation of a firm due to bad publicity both from creditors and
potential investors. There could be even spillover to other aspects of the society which
would trace back to the defaulting firm. Other aspects such as bond renegotiation,
bankruptcy renegotiation as well as other access for future credit could greatly be
limited as a result of large amounts of defaults.
For the Cost part of 𝐶𝑖 is simply 𝑥𝑖 such that 𝑥𝑖 : 𝑥𝑖 → 𝑥𝑖 is linear as we assume
that storage at 𝑡 = 0 is spending forgone and as such, becomes a past cost the firm









(𝐿𝑖 − 𝜋𝑥𝑖 )2 + 𝑥𝑖, (1.7)
10Note that we refer to the total default as opposed to simply its first wave. Hence, the system
does not trace defaults of each firm from its origin (be it external or network based) but imposes
penalty on the full shortfall.
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subject to
𝜋𝑥𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖 ∙ (x + y), (1.8)
We ignore the non-negativity of 𝑥𝑖 given that assumption 1.2.3 binds our optimization
which implies that 𝑥𝑖  0 for each firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟. The first order condition is then:
𝐶
′
𝑖(𝑥𝑖) = −𝑤𝑖𝑖Λ(𝐿𝑖 − 𝜋𝑥𝑖 ) + 1 = 0. (1.9)
The left hand side of (1.9) is the marginal benefit of the action, and as such, captures
the reduction in default punishment resulting from a marginal increase in the action
𝑥𝑖.
It is possible to view the parameter 𝑤𝑖𝑖 from different perspectives, however at
this point, it is seen prominently as the value of additional payment a dollar action
yields a firm 𝑖 owing from the feedback loop that a default for the firm 𝑖 also takes.
For this reason, it then captures the marginal rate of transformation from the action
𝑥𝑖 into the repayment 𝜋𝑥𝑖 . This should not be confused with the total payments
the system makes for a dollar action by firm 𝑖.11 Finally, from the marginal rate of
substitution from the action 𝑥𝑖 to the repayments 𝜋𝑥𝑖 is then (Λ(𝐿𝑖 − 𝜋𝑥𝑖 ))−1.
1.3 General Characterization of Equilibrium
In this part, we present the optimal storage of each defaulting firm which is the solu-
tion to the optimisation progamme in the previous section. We have the statement
below while keeping assumption 1.2.1 and assumption 1.2.3 in mind:
Proposition 1.3.1. Let 𝐴𝑖 = 1𝑤𝑖𝑖Λ
(︁









11Which would be the threat index as in Demange (2016).
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For each firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟, the following best replies hold;




Proof. See Appendix for proof.
Remark 1.3.1. Nash decisions 𝑥𝑖∈𝒟 under 𝜆𝑖 = 1 ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟 arises from a game of






Our best reply function in (1.10) is linear which has a form that is noticeably
isomorphic to best replies found in general public goods in networks literature.12. In
interpretation, the firm 𝑖 reduces its effort given an increase in effort 𝑥𝑗 of any other
firm 𝑗 ∈ 𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖 to which 𝑔𝑗𝑖 > 0. It is worth noting that the reason (1.10) does not hold
as 𝑥𝑖 = max
{︁





is due to assumption 1.2.3 because the non-
negativity constraint always holds13. The shape of the best reply from (1.23) is linear
and the degree of change is −𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑤𝑖𝑖
. This is because from (1.10), firm 𝑖 substitutes
every 1$ amount of 𝑥𝑗 relative to its liability proportion.
The value 1
𝑤𝑖𝑖Λ
is multiplied by the bracket components of 𝐴𝑖 to serves as a counter
to the effects of default feedback. This is as firm 𝑖 intends to find the actual saving
amount and default of firm 𝑖 in its full scale also results from feedback firm 𝑖’s initial
default, then its actual requirement need be discounted by the feedback parameter
𝑤𝑖𝑖.
12Notably Bramoullé et al. (2010) or Allouch (2015).
13It is always the case that 𝑥𝑖∈𝒟 = 0.
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1.3.1 Equilibrium for a defaulting Firm
With linear best replies as given in the previous equation, equilibrium decisions can
be estimated for defaulting Firms. Similarly, for the firm 𝑖 still holding our previous
assumptions, we have the following statement,
Proposition 1.3.2. Let Nash equilibrium storage vector be given as x* = (𝑥*𝑖 )𝑖∈𝒟 ∈
R𝑑+. Also, let 𝐵 = [𝐵𝑖𝑗] ∈ R𝑑×𝑑 be a matrix while 𝐴 = (𝐴𝑖)𝑖∈𝒟 ∈ R𝑑+ be a column









under the following necessary conditions:











)︀)︀−1]︁ where 𝜇𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝐺) is the minimum eigenvalue of a
matrix 𝐺.
Proof. See Appendix for proof.
More specific to the network we consider, we elaborate on proposition 1.3.2 by
writing an initial lemma as stated below;
Lemma 1.3.1. Assume a network 𝐺𝑇 , which is a directed ring network then it holds
that for 𝒟 = {0, 1, . . . , 𝑑}
𝑤00 = 𝑤11 = . . . = 𝑤𝑑𝑑. (1.12)
Proof. See Appendix for proof.
As a special case of lemma 1.3.1, take for example a directed ring network where







= 𝑔𝑗𝑖. We however leave 𝐵𝑖𝑗 as it is
14Note that 𝑑 is the cardinality of the set 𝒟.
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because of its ability to capture the dynamic nature of 𝒟. As such we then have the
following corollary from proposition 1.3.2 as;
Corollary 1.3.1 (Directed Ring Networks). Assume a network 𝐺𝑇 , which is a di-





















Proof. See Appendix for proof.
This is so that in general, if firms with obligation are forced to avoid default at
all cost and such information is available to all firms, each potential defaulter stores
the amount that equals its first wave default.
A quick glance at the equation takes us back to definition 1.2.3. It is seen then
that the firm 𝑖 pays an amount that includes its First wave default and its reduction
would be subject to the value of Λ as well as the magnitude of the work of lengths.
Given the Nash equilibrium vector x*(𝒟,Λ,y), we have the following equilibrium for
each firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟 as written in the result below;
Proposition 1.3.3. Nash equilibrium for a firm 𝑖 case satisfies the following equa-
tion,
𝑥*𝑖 = 𝐿𝑖 −
∑︁
𝑗∈𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖










Proof. See Appendix for proof.
Observing (1.14), the Nash action of each player 𝑖 can be decomposed in two
segments namely:
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1. The liability gap which for a firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟 we denote as 𝑙𝑖 such that;
𝑙𝑖 = 𝐿𝑖 −
∑︁
𝑗∈𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖
𝑔𝑗𝑖𝐿𝑗 − 𝑦𝑖. (1.15)
2. The centrality gap we denote as 𝛾𝑖 such that we have:




Which in vector form for 𝑄 = (𝛾𝑖)𝑖∈𝒟 ∈ R𝑑+ is represented as;
𝑄 = (I−𝐺𝑇 ) · 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(w) (1.17)
The liability gap is synonymous to the value of first-wave default value of the
Fictitious Default Algorithm (FDA) proposed by Eisenberg and Noe (2001). In
its interpretation, it represents the amount of default by a firm which arises from
circumstances outside the network (hence, not as a result of default contagion from
debtor firms within the network). The value 𝑙𝑖 of each firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟 is also a special
case of the stress of a firm found in Paddrik et al. (2020)15 with the contrast that
why we assume unlimited access to 𝑥𝑖(though at cost of repayment), the greater 𝑙𝑖
is, the greater the stress on the firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟 thus increasing its likelihood of default.
The centrality gap in a way reflects an additional benefit resulting from greater
strategic dependence. To understand, take for example that 𝐺𝑇 is a directed ring,






This means that the stronger the firms direct relative asset for any firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟 (
15That is the instance to which a firm 𝑖 receives all it is owed from its debtors in 𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖 .
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𝑔𝑗𝑖), then the lower 𝛾𝑖 is.16 The firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟 can now store an amount
lower than its liability gap. Also the value 𝑤𝑖𝑖 is useful in a default network which is
strongly connected as it hints to spread of influence of a firm. From lemma 1.3.1 the
result on ring networks as as such because each firm has only one directed outgoing
link. However, in order forms of strongly connected networks, it could vary depending
on the spread of interlinks. This is because additional links creates additional loops.




𝑔𝑖𝑗 is the same weight ∀ firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟. Adapting 𝑙𝑖 and 𝛾𝑖 into
(1.14) gives us the following Nash equation;




It is also worth noting from (1.18) that a sizeable Λ coupled up with 𝛾𝑖 for
each firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟 guarantees that the value 𝜆−1𝛾𝑖 remains relatively small in size
when compared to 𝑙𝑖. Additionally, the value 1 −
∑︀
𝑗∈𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖




𝑔𝑗𝑖 < 1, then the greater the amount of direct relative asset owed to the
firm 𝑖, then the greater it has to store close to but less than its first wave default.
Should the reverse hold however, the firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟 would then be required to store
above its first wave default. This in itself is due to the increased dependence leading
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1.3.2 Relation to Public Good Problems
Recall our best reply in (1.10) as 𝑥𝑖 = 𝐴𝑖 − Λ−1
∑︀
𝑗∈𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖
𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑗. In the case where
assumption 1.2.3 was absent so that we had
𝑥𝑖 = max




then it will be likened to public good problems in network found in Bramoullé et
al. (2010), (Bramoullé & Kranton, 2007) or Allouch (2015) etc which are specifi-
cally focused on private provision on public good and best replies revealing strategic
substitution. Such substitution is a quality found in agents behavior to a privately
provided public good. In this case, the item linked to the public good consumption
for a firm 𝑖 is its 𝜋𝑥𝑖 . While the firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟 tries to ensure that 𝜋𝑥𝑖 ≈ 𝐿𝑖 by storing 𝑥𝑖,
it then provides the resource 𝑥𝑖 to its set 𝒩 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 (hence, its direct creditors).
Also, it is common in public good problems for Nash equilibrium decision to
include inactive firms17. In our model, assumption 1.2.3 rules out such possibility.
However, since for sizeable values of Λ, we have the liability gap which dominates the
equilibrium storage, then it is the case for each firm that while they are all active,
they substitute/free-ride on the storage of their direct debtors as their total payment
𝜋𝑥𝑖 is based on the sum of all decisions all firm 𝑗 ∈ 𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖 .
1.3.3 Comparative Study
We draw comparisons with Allouch and Jalloul (2016) as it is relatively close in
concept. The set up was where firms face binary choices between defaulting (Ψ𝑖∈𝒟 =
0) or not defaulting(Ψ𝑖∈𝒟 = 1) in 𝑡 = 1. The key parameters included 𝑇 (a𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖 ) which
defines the minimum amount required to avoid default, 𝑟 represents the returns in
17Defined as any firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟 whose Nash decision 𝑥𝑖 = 0.
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𝑡 = 1 for investing/storing the fixed endowment 𝑥𝑖 at 𝑡 = 0 while ?̄?𝑖 ≡ 𝑥𝑖 comes from
the utility of defaulting hence, satisfying the condition 𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 0) = 𝑈𝑖(0, ?̄?𝑖). Given
its best replies, its strategy is to not default when (1+𝑟)𝑥𝑖−𝑇 (a𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖 ) ≥ ?̄?𝑖, otherwise,
the firm defaults. Thus Ψ𝑖∈𝒟 = 1 also implied 𝑥𝑖 is stored with Ψ𝑖∈𝒟 = 0 implying
𝑥𝑖 is consumed at 𝑡 = 0.
While payoffs and functional forms of the best replies differ significantly in both
models,18 we draw attention to the threshold value 𝑇 (a𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖 ).
𝐴 𝐵 𝐶
𝐿𝐴 𝐿𝐵
Figure 1-2: Line liability network with 3 firms.
Observe then from fig. 1-2 above that given at firm 𝐴 and firm 𝐵 are defaulters at
𝑡− 0, a unique strictly dominant Nash equilibrium always exits in a default game as
in Allouch and Jalloul (2016). However, as such the threshold value for Firm 𝐴 given
as 𝑇𝐴(a𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖 ) = 𝐿𝐴 − 𝑦𝐴 which corresponds strictly to its first wave default/liability
gap as in our equilibrium. In general, for 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟, we have that












Where Ψ𝑗 ∈ {0, 1} and as such is 0 if Firm 𝑗 Nash decision is to default and
1 otherwise. This threshold value in (1.20) thus reveals the possibility whereby it
corresponds to the first wave default even in a cyclical network. For example, if
𝑗 ∈ 𝒟 ∩ 𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖 and Ψ𝑗 = 1, then 𝑇𝑖(Ψ𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖 = 1) is equal to the first wave default for
Firm 𝑖. In a way, it can then be seen that results from our model point to solutions
similar to 𝑇𝑖(a𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖 ). However, an easily observable difference is that 𝑇𝑖(a𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖 ) is a
product of corner equilibrium choices of directly connected defaulting firms. Our
18Firms in Allouch and Jalloul (2016) are more likely to store if other firms connected to them
store.
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equilibrium 𝑥𝑖 is a product of a continuous mapping best reply function of other
connected firms storage which does not have to be a directly connected firm.
1.3.4 Efficiency and Equilibrium
Efficiency broadly can be split into individual as well as social efficiency. Given




𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖), then the Nash equilibrium of each firm corresponds
to the amount of storage 𝑥𝑖 that yields minimum cost the firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟, which is its
individually efficient storage. For efficiency of the system, we assume the planner who
sets Λ(𝜗𝑖) binding on each contracts does so to act as a deterrent towards default. We
also know that the centrality gap 𝛾𝑖∈𝒟 becomes closer to zero the greater Λ is. Hence,





𝑖 is maximised when Λ is such that 𝛾𝑖∈𝒟 ≈ 0.
1.4 Punishment and Non-interior equilibrium
So far, we have estimated the storage value 𝑥𝑖∈𝒟 through the mapping 𝑥𝑖 : 𝑥𝑖 →
𝐶𝑖(𝜋
𝑥
𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖) is convex (cup-shaped) and compact in 𝑥𝑖. However, should the shape be
𝑥𝑖 : 𝑥𝑖 → 𝐶𝑖(𝜋𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖) is concave, intuitions drawn might be valuable especially for
robustness purpose. We do not attempt to go quite in-depth on this. Observe the
interaction in its simplest form. Assume then that we have;
𝐶𝑖(𝜋
𝑥
𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖) = Λ𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐿𝑖 − 𝜋𝑥𝑖 ) + 𝑥𝑖. (1.21)
Then assuming assumption 1.2.1 and assumption 1.2.3 still binds, we present some
little intuition summarised as follows;
Proposition 1.4.1. Given a punishment function 𝐶𝑖(𝜋𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖) such that 𝑥𝑖 : 𝑥𝑖 →
𝐶𝑖(𝜋
𝑥
𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖) is convex, if Λ is of significant magnitude, Nash equilibrium decisions ∀
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𝑖 ∈ 𝒟 corresponds to the first wave default so that the following equation holds true











− 𝑦𝑖 if 𝐶𝑖(𝑥𝑖 > 0) ≤ 𝐶𝑖(𝑥𝑖 = 0)
0 otherwise
(1.22)
so far as ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟, 𝑥𝑖 ∈ ]0,R+].
Proof. See Appendix for proof.
In essence, what we show here simply put is that while local minimum exists
at two critical values of 𝑥𝑖(
∑︀
𝑗∈𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖
𝑥𝑗) ∀ 𝑖 ̸= 𝑗, then since the punishment Λ is
homogeneous, then a value of Λ that forces min𝑥𝑖 𝐶𝑖(𝜋𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖) : 𝑥𝑖 > 0 would also
force all other 𝑥𝑗 > 0 : 𝑗 ̸= 𝑖. This then means that depending on Λ magnitude,
it equilibrium would be binary: All default at 𝑡 = 1 or all contribute an amount
equivalent to its first wave default completely. A simple illustration of this problem
can be found as follows.





𝑤𝑖𝑗(𝑥𝑗 + 𝑦𝑗) = 30
then at 𝑥𝑖 = 0 Implies,
𝐶𝑖(𝜋
𝑥
𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖) = 1.69
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and and at 𝑥𝑖 = 1𝑤𝑖𝑖 . . . we have,
𝐶𝑖(𝜋
𝑥
𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖) = 25
𝑥*𝑖 = 0 minimizes 𝐶𝑖(𝜋𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖).
This the implies that the Nash profile arises from a new binary best reply, partic-
ularly 𝑥𝑖 = {0, 𝜗𝑖(𝑥𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖 )} thus taking a similar game structure once again to Allouch
and Jalloul (2016). Observe then that the Centrality Gap seizes to be a component
of the equilibrium as there is no longer a trade off of choices such that each defaulting
firm either does all or nothing.
1.5 Summary and Conclusions
So far we have introduced behavior of firms faced with ex-ante default and also cor-
responding penalties which is mapped by such defaults. Firms storing to avoid such
default strategically substitute to arrive at the best amount of storage. Hence, their
actions yields a public goods which can be substituted by their outgoing neighbours.
Overall, when there is a sizeable amount of punishment in such ex-ante default sys-
tem, we have seen that firms are best to store the amount corresponding to the
amount of the default specifically attributed to each firm caused by factors external
to the network. Lastly, we see that a firms position in a network can (especially when
the punishment intensity is low) lead to greater or lesser burden of storage on the
defaulting firm.
The model provides a basic framework into behaviors in well bounded default net-
works. Even at that, we distance ourselves from instances where potential kinks/dis-
continuity might arise. It would be useful to merge and investigate equilibrium under
a best response which defaults are cyclical but not all firms default at first wave. Also
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shy away from restricted endowments of firms and implicitly assume in our equilib-
rium that such endowments are fully liquid. These can potentially be improved up
thereby adopting methods from Amini et al. (2016) or Feinstein (2017) which can
lead to a more sequential (algorithmic) Nash equilibrium. Also our model assumes
homogeneous default rate applied to each firm. In reality, the size of Λ could depend
on other factors such as the size of the firm as well as its network position. We
believe that this idea provides a valuable extension to the model. Additionally, there
could be other means to ensure that firms avoid default such as prudential regulation
including reserve requirement which could be enforced by a regulator. Such instances
are weakly accounted for in our model as one might say it would be the basis for our
exogenous cash for each debtor firm. However, treating this policy as endogenous
could shed additional light to firms behavior especially banks.
To conclude, our results arises from an environment where a planner uses an
alternate approach monetary interventions or prudential regulations to achieve sim-
ilar goals. Here firms are the decision maker as opposed to regulation. Broadly, in
attempt to understand from various behaviors in response catalyst that could po-
tentially lead to or avoid a default crises, interactions between firms/nodes involved
under different settings provides valuable intuitions. Outcome of firms actions in
themselves could serve as valuable hints and predictors to not only the anticipated
cries but the individual firms roles in leading to or away from it.
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1.6 Appendix
Existence properties and the impact of Assumption
1.2.3
Observing the best reply function at (1.10), we see that 𝑥𝑗 : 𝑥𝑗 → 𝑥𝑖 by a coefficient
defined by 𝐵𝑖 =
𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑤𝑖𝑖
. Also the parameters 𝑤𝑖𝑗, 𝑤𝑖𝑖 are elements of the matrix w.
Assume then 𝒩 = {𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘} where firm 𝑘 ∈ {𝒩 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 ∪ 𝒩 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑗 } such that firm 𝑘 is a sink
node. Then also assume 𝒟 = {𝑖, 𝑗}, we have the following typically already shown
in our proof of lemma 1.3.1;







so that 𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝑤𝑗𝑗 = (1−𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑔𝑗𝑖)−1. Then also assume only 𝑖 is a first wave defaulter so
that 𝐿𝑗−𝑔𝑖𝑗𝐿𝑖−𝑦𝑗 ≥ 0 but 𝐿𝑗−𝑔𝑖𝑗𝜋0𝑖 −𝑦𝑗 < 0. Then it means ∃ 𝑥𝑖 : 𝐿𝑗−𝑔𝑖𝑗𝜋0𝑖 (𝑥𝑖)−
𝑦𝑗 = 0. In such a case, 𝛿 · 𝑔𝑗𝑖 = 0 and as such 𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝑤𝑗𝑗 = (1 − (𝑔𝑖𝑗 · 0))−1 = 1 or in
matrix, we have;




This causes a kink such that there exists a discontinuity within the best reply
function for 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 and so is it for any firm in the initial default loop. To evade
this problem we then hold assumption 1.2.3 such that ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟, 𝐿𝑖 − 𝑔𝑗𝑖𝐿𝑗 − 𝑦𝑖 < 0.
This then means that assuming 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝒩 are in default, w as well as 𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝑤𝑗𝑗 =
(1 − 𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑔𝑗𝑖)−1 are constant for all values, say 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝒟, 𝑥𝑖 → 𝐴𝑖 − 𝐵𝑗𝑖𝑥𝑗 is linear and
continuous and vice versa.
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Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.2.1
Assume no sink node exits, then the values in each column of 𝑔′ sum to
∑︁
𝑖
[𝐺𝑇 ]𝑗𝑖 = 1 ∀𝑗
which is the same as the row sum of 𝑔. It the follows that when 𝛿 = 𝐽 such that all
assumption 1.2.1 holds,
(I−𝐺𝑇 ) is not invertible.
When (I−𝐺𝑇 ) is invertible, then the spectral radius 𝜌(𝐺𝑇 ) ∈ (−1, 1), and
(I−𝐺𝑇 )−1 = I + 𝐺𝑇 + (𝐺𝑇 )2 + (𝐺𝑇 )3 + ...
However, with the existence of sink node, invertiblity is guaranteed as as 𝐺𝑇 ̸= 1
because ∃ 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟 such that
∑︀
𝑗∈𝒟 𝑔𝑖𝑗 < 1. As such 𝐺
𝑇 ̸= 1 such that 𝜌(𝐺𝑇 ) ∈ (−1, 1).
This property also is the regularity lemma in Eisenberg and Noe (2001) where the
clearing payment vector can simply be mapped to exogenous cash flow through the
inversion in essence y : y → 𝜋 is given as simply;
𝜋 = (I−𝐺𝑇 )−1 ∙ y,
when all paying firms are defaulting. 
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Proof of Proposition 1.3.1
Given the FOC in (1.9) we have,
𝑤𝑖𝑖Λ(𝐿𝑖 − 𝜋𝑥𝑖 ) = 1
Then making 𝜋𝑥 the subject of the formula gives
𝜋𝑥𝑖 = 𝐿𝑖 −
1
𝑤𝑖𝑖Λ
Then recall 𝜋𝑥𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖) + 𝑤𝑗𝑖(𝑥𝑗 + 𝑦𝑗) so that we then have
𝑤𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖) + 𝑤𝑗𝑖(𝑥𝑗 + 𝑦𝑗) = 𝐿𝑖 −
1
𝑤𝑖𝑖Λ
→ then to make 𝑥𝑖 the subject becomes
𝑤𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖) = 𝐿𝑖 −
1
𝑤𝑖𝑖Λ

























1. Default and Punishments with Systemic Risk
Proof of Proposition 1.3.2











let 𝐵 = [𝐵𝑖𝑗] such that 𝐵𝑖𝑗 =
𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑤𝑖𝑖
then be the 𝑑× 𝑑 zero diagonal matrix whose ele-
ments for 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝒟. 𝐴 = (𝐴𝑖)𝑖∈𝒟 such that 𝐴𝑖 = 1𝑤𝑖𝑖Λ
(︁






𝑦𝑖. Then we have the vector form best reply given as;
x = 𝐴− Λ−1 ∙ 𝐵x. (1.24)
Existence of x is the guaranteed under Brouwer’s fixed point theorem as [0,𝐴] →
[0,𝐴] intersects with the monotonic mapping f : x → 𝐴−Λ−1 ·𝐵x. For uniqueness
however, it is guaranteed by positive definiteness of (I + Λ−1 ·𝐵) which because 𝐵












is met. A more detailed explanation of this condition
can be found in works such as Rosen (1965). 
Proof of Lemma 1.3.1
Take the same example in 1-1 for simplicity. Since both Firm 𝑖 and Firm 𝑗 are













then notice from the diagonal that 𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝑤𝑗𝑗 = (1 − 𝑔𝑗𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗)−1. 
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Proof of Corollary 1.3.1






then for each firm 𝑖 and firm 𝑗 ∈ 𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖 , 𝐵𝑖𝑗 =
𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑤𝑖𝑖
= 𝑔𝑗𝑖 this means that the Nash
equilibrium vector holds as follows;
x* = (I +
1
Λ














is positive definite then x is uniquely












Proof of Proposition 1.3.3
Without loss of generality, assume that 𝒟 = {𝑖, 𝑗} as in fig. 1-1. Then we have the



















− 𝑤𝑖𝑗(𝑥𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖)
)︂
− 𝑦𝑗
















− 𝑤𝑖𝑗(𝑥𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖)
)︂





















































and since we have,
𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝑤𝑗𝑗 = (1 − 𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑔𝑗𝑖)−1
𝑤𝑗𝑖 = 𝑔𝑗𝑖𝑤𝑗𝑗, 𝑎𝑛𝑑,
𝑤𝑗𝑖 = 𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑖𝑖
Then we have:







which assume 𝐺𝑇 is a directed ring network will then have the equation above written
as:




So that in so far as Λ > 0 so that the last part of the equation does not become
undefined, then 𝑥𝑖 exists and is well defined. 
Proof of Proposition 1.4.1
Say we have the following payoff for a firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟 given as follows;
𝐶𝑖 = Λ log
⎛⎝𝐿𝑖 − 𝑤𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖) − ∑︁
𝑗∈𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖
𝑤𝑖𝑗(𝑥𝑗 + 𝑦𝑗) + 1
⎞⎠ + 𝑥𝑖
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and we have the following boundary of 𝑥𝑖 as








Then When 𝑥𝑖 = 0, we have
𝐶𝑖 = Λ log
⎛⎝𝐿𝑖 − 𝑤𝑖𝑖(𝑦𝑖) − ∑︁
𝑗∈𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖
𝑤𝑖𝑗(𝑥𝑗 + 𝑦𝑗) + 1
⎞⎠ .







− 𝑦𝑖, we have the following below;







⎞⎠− 𝑦𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖
⎤⎦− ∑︁
𝑗∈𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖
























If we assume that Λ and first wave default are substantially large such that
C(x > 0) ≤ C(x = 0) then we imply that;
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Then recall that the following holds,
𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝑤𝑗𝑗 = (1 − 𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑔𝑗𝑖)
𝑤𝑖𝑗 = 𝑔𝑗𝑖𝑤𝑗𝑗 𝑎𝑛𝑑
𝑤𝑗𝑖 = 𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑖𝑖
Substituting into 𝑥*𝑖 above gives us;
𝑥*𝑖 =
(1 − 𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑔𝑗𝑖)−1(𝐿𝑖 − 𝑔𝑗𝑖𝐿𝑗)
(1 − 𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑔𝑗𝑖)−2(1 − 𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑔𝑗𝑖)
− 𝑦𝑖
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and finally The Nash for Firm 𝑖 is ;
𝑥*𝑖 = 𝐿𝑖 − 𝑔𝑗𝑖𝐿𝑗 − 𝑦𝑖 (1.26)
Implying First wave default.
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Chapter 2
Frictions in Financial Networks
2.1 Introduction
Networks in itself involves set of nodes connected by some link. While theoretical
financial networks shows directed interlinks between nodes(which could be bilateral)
by frequently a relative liability/asset ratio, the reality is that nodes may represent
more unique and detailed property a mere asset/liability ratio may fail to reveal for
analytical purpose. This means that simple network diagrams do not highlight the
special properties of both the nodes involved or details on the links that bind two
of such interconnected nodes. It is noticeable that, in networks bounded by debt or
payment obligations, payments are assumed to be transferable between parties at no
cost. As such the clearing payment system are designed with such implicit assump-
tion. A core example is the fictitious default sequence proposed by Eisenberg and
Noe (2001). However, the reality is that payments in many cases may not happen
face to face or without the absence of barriers. Embedded within links between firms
could include as impediments to payments. These strain of payments thus spur the
need for an adequate intermediary to facilitate smoother transactions. Intermediaries
might include banks and other monetary institutions. Take an example of a payment
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system existing across different economies with different currencies, exchange rates
then comes into play. Even in cases where exchange rates are stable over period
to payment, there are always tendencies for additional charges to exist per transac-
tion when dealing with foreign currency operations. Impediments involving foreign
currency transaction might hint a policy to reduce pressure on existing countries
exchange. However in spite of such reason, what this means for the indebted firm
is that payments made would have to account for that additional variable payment
costs, hence, frictions to payments. Even in generic local transactions, there exists
bank charges where banks take a certain quota for a transaction as more or less, com-
mission for their services. In general, forms of transaction cost involved in movement
of cash could include; Bank Transfer Charges, Broker/agency fees, Foreign exchange
charges, Change in exchange rates in a network involving foreign exchange debts,
recovery cost, other forms of commissions.
We henceforth use transaction cost and frictions interchangeably for the sake of
this work. This work for this reason attempts to use the equilibrium properties with
the transaction cost to observe the reaction threat indexes to frictions in the system.
In a realistic sense, these forms of transaction cost could be caused by a host of
factors. Factors in this case is grouped into two listed as follows;
1. Market Induced Frictions: Also known as Over-the-counter frictions. These
forms refer to those introduced by the intermediaries who in turn raise the
amount of transaction cost to vary with the demand intensity of these transac-
tions. Other factors that potentially could be considered is the firms financial
health, potential systemic risk as well as other factors including long-term rep-
utation, market structure between intermediaries (competition vs collusion),
etc.
2. Regulatory Imposed Frictions: These are set of transaction cost directly
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imposed by a regulator which oversees the entire system. They are a product of
various amount of sources and in many case may be a form of market regulation
(a price ceiling on floor) between firms and their intermediaries.
For the lens of this essay, transaction cost is viewed as one which originates
from regulatory imposed sources, hence not a direct product of market interactions
between firms and intermediaries. The essay primarily captures a system where pay-
ments are made with certain cost proportional to the levels of payments and as such,
though assets are liquid, an amount is paid to get them to their creditors. We begin
with results on the clearing properties of the Eisenberg and Noe (2001) system as
well as characteristics of the fictitious default system with transaction cost . Because
Demange (2016) is primarily built upon Eisenberg and Noe (2001) equilibrium, we
begin by identifying clearing characteristics in a system with transaction cost, then
proceed into observing potential behaviors of threat indexes where these transaction
costs hold. We show that a unique clearing payment still exist with transaction cost
when similar criteria to those laid out in Eisenberg and Noe (2001) are met. We
then proceed to show that in ranking threat indexes, the total relative link to direct
creditors are the dominant part of a firms threat index compared to other firm. This
result is then summarized into stylized topology such as ring, star as well as nested
split graphs.
Related Literature
Financial frictions in most mainstream economic analysis has paid greater attention
to its effects on general equilibrium. Various examples of works linked to general
equilibrium would include Buss and Dumas (2013) who develops a general equilibrium
model where agents perform everyday trading activities with transaction costs and as
such, the roles in which transaction cost play in portfolio choices of investors, Hasman,
Samartín Sáenz, and van Bommel (2009) proposes an overlapping generations model
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where agents assume intermediaries help to reduce transaction cost. Some important
results they found is that transaction costs reduces cyclical effect in a system. This is
notably similar with our results on transaction costs on threat index. Also, Duncan
and Nolan (2018) summarizes groups of literature focused on financial frictions in
DSGE models and examines loopholes. However, since the advent of increased study
of systemic risk through financial networks which has in recent time gained increasing
attention, there becomes the interest in understanding the importance of frictions in
such partial equilibrium models. Eisenberg and Noe (2001) establishes a generic
model of systemic risk to which some agent(s) initiates defaults and such defaults
leads to other connected agent(s) defaulting. In extreme cases, these defaults even
feeds back to the origin which serves as an easy prototype of a systemic risk/crises.
In an extension of this work, models of frictions has been captured by authors such
as Amini, Filipović, and Minca (2016) as well as Feinstein (2017) where potential
defaulting agents incur liquidation cost on assets to meet up to such debts and the
role in which systemic risk has to play.
Clearing payment equilibrium has been adapted to capture policy decision in
works such as in Demange (2016) who uses these systemic properties to identify
injection points of firms by using a centrality measure known as the threat index. As
a ranking measure, e firms with higher threat index make the most valuable point
to inject cash in order to increase payment in a defaulting system. This index is
identical to the Bonacich Centrality measure for each firm in the default network.1
This is because firms with higher threat indexes are the ones who can potentially
reach the great number of other defaulting firms and with greater magnitude. Hence,
a measure of power and influence as in standard network centrality literature.2
1See Bonacich (1987).
2More precisely Bonacich as well as Eigenvector Centrality.
41
2. Frictions in Financial Networks
2.2 Transaction Cost in Debt Clearing Systems.
Consider an economy with 𝒩 = {1, 2, ..., 𝑛} set of firms. Firm 𝑖’s endowment is 𝑧𝑖.
The endowment of firm 𝑖 denotes the cash flows arriving from outside the financial
system. For each firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 , let the neighbourhood set be given as 𝒩𝑖 such that
𝒩𝑖 = {𝒩 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 ∪ 𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖 } Also, let 𝐿𝑖𝑗 denote the liability that firm 𝑖 owes firm 𝑗 such





𝐿𝑗𝑖 is the total assets of firm 𝑖. Let 𝐺 = [𝑔𝑖𝑗] ∈ R𝑛×𝑛+




of the liability firm 𝑖 owes to firm 𝑗 over the total amount of liabilities of firm 𝑖.
The network formed from 𝐺 is denoted as 𝐺(𝒩 , 𝑔). We also assume that edges (𝑔’s)
form at least on cycle such that other agents not in the cycle are sink nodes. Also,
we assume that 𝑧𝑖 is readily available and firms, even in default do not liquidate.
Standard with the model, all firms are also of equal status including sink nodes.
Let 𝜋 = (𝜋𝑖)𝑖∈𝒩 denote the clearing payment vector, uniquely3 defined as in






As a key modification to this model, suppose for every edge, there exist a market
friction or transaction cost 1 ≥ 𝛿 > 0 representing a particular percentage of total
payment made by an firm 𝑖 to 𝑗 which is deducted to cover this cost such that if
firm 𝑗 pays an amount we denote as 𝜋𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑗 only (1 − 𝛿)𝑔𝑗𝑖𝜋𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑗 reaches agent 𝑖. Let us
denote this value as 𝜋𝑖𝑛𝑗 such that we have,
𝜋𝑖𝑛𝑗 = (1 − 𝛿)𝜋𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑗 .
3Under mild assumptions.
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Also, this then implies that a firm 𝑖 needs to pay about 𝐿𝑖
1−𝛿 to fully meet up to its
obligation 𝐿𝑖 if it can. Adapting this into the clearing mechanism, it becomes:
𝜋𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 = min








if we denote 𝐿𝑖
1−𝛿 = L𝑖 , then we have the (2.2) rewritten as;
𝜋𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 = min






A simple interpretation of 𝜋𝑖𝑛𝑖 would be that a firm 𝑖 who does not default clears
at 𝜋𝑖𝑛𝑖 = 𝐿𝑖. We then define a set 𝒟 = {1, 2, . . . , 𝑑} such that a firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟 if at
clearing, 𝜋𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 < L𝑖. Also we define a set 𝒮 = {1, 2, . . . , 𝑠} such that a firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒮
⇐⇒ firm 𝑖 ̸∈ 𝒟. Hence, we bring in the concept of surplus set to include atleast one
node who is safe and thus, in 𝒮. In essence, the Eisenberg and Noe (2001) concept
of the risk orbit applies so that for each firm 𝑖 such that 𝒩 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 ̸= {}, there exist a
firm 𝑗 which has the following properties;
1. 𝒩 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑗 = {} so that the firm 𝑗 ∈ 𝒮 is a sink node.
2. There exist a directed path 𝑖, 𝑔𝑖0, 0, 𝑔01, 1, . . . , 𝑛, 𝑔𝑛𝑗, 𝑗 from firm 𝑖 to the firm 𝑗.
This is such that firm 𝑗 has the potential to be paid less due to a default firm 𝑖.4
2.2.1 Clearing Payment with Homogeneous Frictions
The fixed point solution to (2.1) is ascertained through iteration which the fictitious
default sequence solves for the clearing system as proposed by Eisenberg and Noe
(2001). We adapt the proposed solution method to our model with 𝛿 ∈ ]0, 1[ so that
4This depends on the the payment of direct debtors to firm 𝑗. For example, a firm 𝑛 for which
𝑛 ∈ 𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑗 and the firm 𝑛 is also a within firm 𝑖’s risk orbit.
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Figure 2-1: A hypothetical line network of a 3-paying Firm with 10% transaction cost:
Arrows pointing downwards shows amount received by firms from debtors.
the clearing computation for the system that solves (2.3) for a given firm 𝑖. To show
this solution, we divide the computation into 2 phases stated as follows:
Phase 1: This simply solves for the value of 𝜋𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 for each firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 so that it
is simply given as;
𝜋𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 = min






Phase 2: This phase is not particularly part of the default sequence iteration.
This computes the value receivable by each firms creditors is shown in the equation
below;
𝜋𝑖𝑛𝑖 = (1 − 𝛿)
(︀







, ∀𝜋𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 < L𝑖,
so that opening the bracket we have:





𝑗 , ∀𝜋𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 < L𝑖,
and we further denote (1 − 𝛿)𝑧𝑖 = 𝜀𝑖 the value firm 𝑖’s creditors then receive would
be:





𝑗 , ∀𝜋𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 < L𝑖. (2.4)
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However for the firm 𝑖 such that 𝜋𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 ≥ L𝑖, it implies the firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒮 and as such,
𝜋𝑖𝑛𝑖 = 𝐿𝑖. This then applies to all firms who are safe. Additionally let us have the
following definition;
Definition 2.2.1. ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 , let equity be defined as the residual asset after settling
all obligations such that at clearing, equity is given as;
𝑒𝑞𝑖
def





𝑗 − L𝑖. (2.5)
The (2.4) reveals that inflows from debtors are net of transaction cost while
further transaction cost applies to payments to creditors as the movement of 𝑧𝑖 to
creditors is a one step movement from the firm 𝑖 while the payment of total receipts
to creditors yields a 2 step movement from each 𝑗 ∈ 𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖 to another firm 𝑘 ∈ 𝒩 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 .
2.3 Clearing Payment Properties
Fundamental clearing characteristics of a system with transaction cost relies of the
following theorem which is hardly different from Eisenberg and Noe (2001) as follows;
Theorem 2.3.1. Given a financial system including sink nodes whose edges contain
transaction costs 𝛿, There exist a clearing payment vector which satisfies the following
conditions;





𝑗 as well as,






This clearing payment vector is unique in so far ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 , the risk orbit is surplus
set.
Proof. See Appendix for proof.
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The result above simply shows that the clearing payment each firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 makes
to 𝒩 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 is one which satisfies the condition of paying at most what it owes or what
it has in pro-rata where the first option is not feasible. Regularity and existence
of a uniquely defined clearing payment for all firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 is a rule with very rare
exceptions5.
Shifting our focus to the fictitious default sequence, we observe that with exis-
tence of frictions, several firms are worse off in terms of value as a result of charges
attributable to each higher level of payment they make. However, another intuition
from the clearing system is that successive defaults by a firm implies that such firm
avoids some value in transaction cost leakage. The reasoning is that those who are
unable to meet up to their full obligation pay less and hence suffer less charges in
total. This is a likely occurrence in networks with ring properties. From the def-
inition definition 2.2.1, let equity of the system be captured in the column vector
eq = (𝑒𝑞𝑖)𝑖∈𝒩 ∈ R𝑛++. Also, let us have other column vectors as 𝜋𝑜𝑢𝑡 = (𝜋𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 )𝑖∈𝒩
and z = (𝑧𝑖)𝑖∈𝒩 . Then we can rewrite (2.5) as
eq = z + (1 − 𝛿)𝐺𝑇𝜋𝑜𝑢𝑡 − 𝜋𝑜𝑢𝑡.
The total residual of the system is then
∑︀
𝑖/∈𝒮 𝑒𝑞𝑖 = 1
𝑇eq. In the Eisenberg and Noe
(2001) model, this amount does not depend on payment 𝜋. However, with friction,
we introduce the following lemma;
Lemma 2.3.1. Let iterations of the clearing system(Waves of defaults) be denoted
as 𝐾 = {1, . . . , 𝜅−1, 𝜅} such that 𝜅 is the iteration that clears the system. Then with
transaction cost (𝛿 > 0), then
∑︀𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑒𝑞𝑖(1) < . . . <
∑︀𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑒𝑞𝑖(𝜅) such that 𝜅 : 𝜅 → eq
is a strictly increasing concave function.
Proof. See Appendix for proof.
5See Eisenberg and Noe (2001) for example of such exceptions.
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The changing values of equity across waves of defaults gives us a hint that initial
iterations of equity might not reveal signs of defaults feedback. Feedbacks occur
strictly in networks where obligations are cyclical. The following results summarize
this point;
Proposition 2.3.1 (Directed Ring Properties). Assume a network 𝐺(𝒩 , 𝑔) with a
subgraph 𝐺1(𝒩1, 𝑔) such that for every {0, 𝑛} ⊂ 𝒩1, there exists a closed walk given
as 0, 𝑔01, 1, . . . , 𝑛− 1, 𝑔𝑛−1,𝑛, 𝑛, 𝑔𝑛0, 0 between firm 0 and firm 𝑛. In so far as amount
of leakage avoided as result of default at clearing is greater than the absolute value of
the negative net equity of creditors at first wave, then defaults do not feedback.
Proof. See Appendix for proof.
The network 𝐺1(𝒩1, 𝑔) is as such strongly connected since a directed walk exists
between every 2 firms within the network. This gives the opportunity for default
feedback due to cyclical obligations and dependency. This happens when a firm, say
firm 𝑖’s initial default causes all firm in firm 𝑖’s risk orbit (directed path) to default
which makes firm 𝑖 default even further. A common case of this kind of network is the
directed ring network. The proposition 2.3.1 gives us the criteria for such feedback
to be avoided. Hence, where it fails to hold, we have a firm defaulting more due to
its initial default. We use the illustration below to show elaborate on this;









Figure 2-2: An Example of a 4-Firm Network
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Other properties of the network are exogenous cash given as 𝑍 = (5, 0, 10, 0)𝑇
while the liability is given 𝐿 = (20, 30, 20, 0)𝑇 , we have the following tables assuming
𝛿 = 0 The clearing is solved in the table below;
Table 2.1: Clearing without friction
𝛿 = 0















assuming 𝛿 = 5%, due to the friction, the liability becomes;
𝐿
0.95
= (21.05, 31.58, 21.05, 0)𝑇
So that the payment system is then solved in the table below;
Table 2.2: Clearing with friction
𝛿 = 0.05
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From the table 2.2, $2.48−$1.32 = $1.16 is the equity gain from 1st wave through
to the 3rd wave. This value is exactly the same as the amount of transaction cost
Firms 𝑖 and 𝑗 did not pay as a result of default. In essence $0.05($21.05 + $31.58)−
$0.05($15+$14.25) = $2.63−$1.4625 = $1.16. The fact that the net equity (excluding
firm 𝑙 who is a sink node. Sink nodes are hence, always excluded) rises as more default
increases satisfies our lemma 2.3.1.
Assuming no friction, if net equity was say −$5 from the first wave, this means
that it maintains the value such that the system falls short of the amount thus
leading to default feedback. However, if from table 2.2 the net equity at 1st wave
was −$1,then it means that with gains of $1.16 through the 3rd wave,6 it leaves net
equity at 3rd wave as $0.16 which is positive for firm 𝑘 and implies the system clears.
For further properties, we proceed introduce the following terminology;








= 𝑒𝑞𝑖(𝛿|𝛿 = 0) ≈ 0.
As such, firms are classified as fragile when they have a near or even zero value
after all their obligations are met. This definition is contextual as such threshold value
might vary depending on the nature of the system. Then as a means of understanding
the effect on such firm, we initiate the following proposition:
Proposition 2.3.2. Let the total default of a firm 𝑖 be 𝜗𝑖(𝛿) = L𝑖 − 𝜋𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 Given
























𝑔𝑗𝑖𝜗𝑗, if 𝜋𝑖𝑛𝑗 < 𝐿𝑗.
(2.6)
Proof. No further proof required.
6Usually the wave equivalent to the total number of firms in the loop.
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Given the concept of a fragile firm, assume then that equity without friction is
zero hence 𝑒𝑞𝑖(𝛿 = 0) = 0. Then the statement above explains that a firm 𝑖 defaults
by the amount equal to 𝛿 times its total assets7 in unique instance where firm 𝑖 still
receives its payment from debtors (𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖 ) in full. Otherwise, it defaults by the amount
equivalent to 𝛿 times its total asset as well as the total sum of default borne by the
firm 𝑖 from its 𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖 .
2.4 Intervention Targeting with Market Frictions
We highlight the effect of transaction cost in decision making models. To do this let
𝑥 = (𝑥𝑖)𝑖∈𝒟 ∈ R𝑛+ such that 𝑥𝑖 represents any exogenous cash amount added to the
endowment 𝑧𝑖 of the firm 𝑖 which could be possibly be an outside intervention. We
adopt the problem in Demange (2016). Assume a planner who has a value function
denoted as 𝑉 (𝑥) who estimates systemic defaults wishes to intervene in other to
reduce or eliminate total default. Here, 𝑉 (𝑥) is piece-wise linear and concave. Also
𝑉 (𝑥) is sub-modular such that for all firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟, 𝑥′𝑖 ≥ 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑥
′





−𝑖) − 𝑉 (𝑥𝑖, 𝑥
′
−𝑖) ≤ 𝑉 (𝑥
′
𝑖, 𝑥−𝑖) − 𝑉 (𝑥𝑖, 𝑥−𝑖).
Assuming no fragile defaulting firm 𝑖, 𝑉 ′(𝑥𝑖) = 𝜇𝑖 where 𝜇𝑖 is the threat index
for the firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟 given as;




When we then include frictions to the model, we then have(2.7) rewritten as;




Let us then have 𝜇 = (𝜇𝑖)𝑖∈𝒟 ∈ R𝑑+ as the vector of threat indexes of each firm. The
7Same as 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 times firm 𝑖’s total liability
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equation above in vector form is written as follows;
𝜇(𝒟,𝐺, 𝛿) = (I− (1 − 𝛿) ·𝐺𝒟×𝒟)−1 · 1𝒟 (2.9)
Observe then that the equation above corresponds to the Bonacich Centrality of the
network derived from the relative liability matrix of defaulting firms 𝐺𝒟×𝒟. Hence,
the threat points to the defaulting firm whose $1 increase in asset(liquid cash) will
lead to the greatest total payment in the system. This implies a multiplier effect such
that in so far there exist a firm 𝑗 such that 𝑗 ∈ 𝒟 ∩ 𝒩 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 , then the overall system
payment from a $1 increase to 𝑧𝑖 would be greater than $1.
Also, there are parallels that can be drawn with the threat index and princi-
pal component of a matrix 𝐺 as proposed in Galeotti, Golub, and Goyal (2017).
Though we have the contrast of such properties being obtainable in symmetric (ad-
jacency) matrix, the intuitions are similar in that in games of strategic compliments
(for example, the (2.1)), the greater the principal component of a firm, the greater
its importance in intervention targeting. Similarly, the threat index here gives the
same interpretation. Moreover, the amplifying factor in Galeotti et al. (2017) is
synonymous to the discounted value (1 − 𝛿) in our model.
2.5 Endogenous Threat Index Rankings
We observe the impact of transaction costs to threat index rankings of firm in different
default network topology. Before we proceed, let us introduce the following definition;
Definition 2.5.1. A direct relative liability for any firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟 is the sum of
relative liability to all defaulting firms. If we denote the direct relative liability for
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Figure 2-3: An Example of a 3-paying Firm Network which arrow shows relative liability
Keeping this in mind, we highlight some overall characteristics of the threat index
under transaction cost in the following lemma;
Lemma 2.5.1. In so far as there exists one or more sink-nodes such that 𝒟 ( 𝒩 ,
even with networks with cyclical properties (I− (1 − 𝛿) ·𝐺𝒟×𝒟) is always invertible.
To which we then have the theorem as follows;
Theorem 2.5.1. Given 𝜇(𝒟,𝐺, 𝛿) = (I− (1− 𝛿) ·𝐺𝒟×𝒟)−1 ·1𝒟, then as 𝛿 → 1 such
that 𝜇(𝒟,𝐺, 𝛿) → 1𝒟 , the direct relative liability 𝑔𝑖 of each firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟 dominates
the value 𝜇𝑖.
This result as such has significant implications especially as it pertains the ranking
of each firms threat index. We explore some of implications of our theorem above by
examining its implication in stylized network. Let 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝜇(𝒟,𝐺, 𝛿)) be the rank of
threat index ∀ elements of 𝒟 while 𝑔(𝒟,𝐺)) = (𝑔𝑖)𝑖∈𝒟 be the direct relative liability
vector so that 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑔(𝒟,𝐺))) is the rank of each firms direct relative liability in
ascending order. We highlight an important corollary built on the theorem 2.5.1
above as follows;
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Corollary 2.5.1. Assuming the threat index vector 𝜇(𝒟,𝐺, 𝛿) is proportional to the
the direct relative liability 𝑔(𝒟,𝐺), then assume 2 values of 𝛿, say 𝛿1 and 𝛿2 such
that 𝛿2  𝛿1. Then we have that 𝜇(𝒟,𝐺, 𝛿1) = 𝜇(𝒟,𝐺, 𝛿2).
Proof. Particularly intuitive as since for each firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟, 𝑔𝑖 dominates 𝜇𝑖(𝐺, 𝛿) the
greater the value of 𝛿.
This corollary then forms the most important intuition of our model as it means
that where the 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝜇(𝒟,𝐺, 𝛿)) is not proportional to 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑔(𝒟,𝐺)), then there
exists the probability that given 𝛿2  𝛿1, then 𝜇(𝒟,𝐺, 𝛿1) = 𝜇(𝒟,𝐺, 𝛿2) implying
that threat index rankings are then altered by the different size of transaction cost.
We discuss examples and conditions of this in stylised networks as follows;




























Figure 2-4: Three forms of Directed Ring Networks.
Take an example from fig. 2-4a, we have 𝑔(𝒟,𝐺) = (0.45, 0.45, 0.45)𝑇
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which is proportional to the threat index 𝜇(𝒟,𝐺) = (1.82, 1.82, 1.82)𝑇 . Hence,
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝜇(𝒟,𝐺, 𝛿)) remains constant for any 𝛿 ∈ ]0, 1[.
In the fig. 2-4b , 𝜇(𝒟,𝐺) = (2.28, 2.32, 2.93)𝑇 while 𝑔(𝒟,𝐺) = (0.55, 0.45, 0.85)𝑇 .
Since 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝜇(𝒟,𝐺, 𝛿 = 0)) ⇒ 𝐶 > 𝐵 > 𝐴 while 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑔(𝒟,𝐺)) ⇒ 𝐶 > 𝐴 > 𝐵,
then 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝜇(𝒟,𝐺, 𝛿)) is robust to 𝛿. To confirm, take for example 𝛿 = 0.5, then we
have 𝜇(𝒟,𝐺, 𝛿 = 0.5) = (1.37, 1.36, 1.58)𝑇 such that 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝜇(𝒟,𝐺, 𝛿 = 0)) ⇒ 𝐶 >
𝐴 > 𝐵 which then corresponds to 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑔(𝒟,𝐺)).
Lastly, for the fig. 2-4c , 𝜇(𝒟,𝐺) = (1.72, 1.60, 1.09)𝑇 while 𝑔(𝒟,𝐺)) =
(0.45, 0.55, 0.05)𝑇 . Since 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝜇(𝒟,𝐺, 𝛿 = 0)) ⇒ 𝐴 > 𝐵 > 𝐶 while
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑔(𝒟,𝐺)) ⇒ 𝐵 > 𝐴 > 𝐶, then 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝜇(𝒟,𝐺, 𝛿)) is robust to 𝛿. To con-
firm, take for example 𝛿 = 0.7, then we have 𝜇(𝒟,𝐺, 𝛿 = 0.7) = (1.16, 1.17, 1.02)𝑇
such that 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝜇(𝒟,𝐺, 𝛿 = 0)) ⇒ 𝐵 > 𝐴 > 𝐶 which also corresponds to
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑔(𝒟,𝐺)).
2.5.2 Sample 2: Non-Cyclical Defaults
Here, we refer back to our construct of the default network 𝐺(𝒟, 𝑔) with its cor-
responding matrix 𝐺𝑑×𝑑 pointing to the fact that for a firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟 and firm
𝑗 ∈ {𝒟′ ∩𝒩 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 } where 𝒟












(b) Default Network in line form
Figure 2-5: Shows a ring network with non-cyclical default being represented in Line form.
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Because links to and from a non-defaulting firm are excluded from 𝐺𝑑×𝑑, then
if original network 𝐺(𝒩 , 𝑔) is a ring network of debtor firms such that one or more
firm do not default, then the network of the default set 𝐺(𝒟, 𝑔) is a line network.
An example of this is reflected in fig. 2-5 where we see the representation between
𝐺(𝒩 , 𝑔) which is a ring as in fig. 2-5a and then the transformation to a line for
𝐺(𝒟, 𝑔) as in fig. 2-5a.
For the threat index for defaulting firms in fig. 2-5 , we have that 𝜇(𝒟,𝐺) =
(1.70, 1.55, 1)𝑇 while 𝑔(𝒟,𝐺)) = (0.45, 0.55, 0)𝑇 and it means 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝜇(𝒟,𝐺, 𝛿 =
0)) ⇒ 𝐴 > 𝐵 > 𝐶 while 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑔(𝒟,𝐺)) ⇒ 𝐵 > 𝐴 > 𝐶. Again, if we have
𝛿 = 0.9 for example, we then have 𝜇(𝒟,𝐺, 𝛿 = 0.6) = (1.219, 1.220, 1)𝑇 such that
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝜇(𝒟,𝐺, 𝛿 = 0)) ⇒ 𝐵 > 𝐴 > 𝐶.
The combination of the ring and line default networks can improve our under-
standing of a special form of network known as Nested Split Graphs. Split graphs are
increasingly studied as they relate to understanding qualities relating to subgroup
behavior within network. As Belhaj, Bervoets, and Deroïan (2016) rightly points
out, the core-periphery network is a special case of a Nested split graph. Here, we
have 2 partition set namely the Core and the Periphery.
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Figure 2-6: Core-periphery default network.
For directed network properties, we identify core set of firms as those whom are
directly connected to other core firms while connected to one or more periphery.
Periphery firms on the other hand are only connected to their corresponding core
and as such are not connected to other periphery firms.
If we take an illustration from fig. 2-7 above, we observe that 𝜇6 = 𝜇9 = 1 and
remains constant irrespective of 𝛿. Subsequently, for the rest of the subgroup of
defaulting firms {6, 9}′ ( 𝒟, the criterion on the 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝜇(𝒟,𝐺, 𝛿 = 0)) and its pro-
portionality to 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑔(𝒟,𝐺)) determines the responsiveness of 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝜇(𝒟,𝐺, 𝛿))
to the size of 𝛿.
2.5.3 Endogenous Defaults and the Threat Index
Let 𝒟′ = 𝒮 ( 𝒩 represent the non-defaulting set of firms. Then we have the
following statement;
56
2. Frictions in Financial Networks
Proposition 2.5.1. Assume network graph 𝐺(𝒩 , 𝑔, 𝛿) which strongly connected8. If
at 𝛿 = 0, we have that 𝒮 ̸= {}, ∃ 0 < 𝛿 ≤ 1 to which 𝒮(𝛿) = {} so that default
becomes cyclical.
This is because even otherwise safe systems become fragile in the face of high
transaction costs on payments as more resources are then required to meet up with
firms obligations.
Figure 2-7: Where a full loop of firms default due to transaction cost: Observe the sharp
rise in the threat index of Firm A and Firm B when Firm C joins in default due to an
increase in 𝛿.
This possibility is earlier introduced in section 3 where we examined the ability
for a fragile system to face systemic crises when frictions are introduced and as
such, exhibit feedback characteristics. Its implication then is that 𝒟 is responsive
in a discreet manner to the value of 𝛿. This in turn affects the value of the threat
index of each firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟 𝜇𝑖(𝒟,𝐺, 𝛿) as well as its rank 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝜇(𝒟,𝐺, 𝛿)). An
example can be seen from fig. 2-5a whose threat index relationship to 𝛿 is given in
fig. 2-7. Observe then that at at 𝛿 = 0.5, firm 𝐸 now joins the default set and if
8Strongly connected graph here refers to a case where ∀ firms 0, 𝑛 ∈ 𝒩 , there exist a directed
path(cycle) 0, 𝑔01, 1, 𝑔12, . . . , 𝑔𝑛−1,𝑛, 𝑛, 𝑔0,𝑛, 0).
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your compare firm 𝐴, firm 𝐵 and firm 𝐶’s index as shown in the figure, firm 𝐶,
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝜇(𝒟,𝐺, 𝛿 = 0.5)) ⇒ 𝐶 > 𝐵 > 𝐴. Also observable is the snap switch between
𝜇𝐴 and 𝜇𝐵 in terms of ranking. This is the implication of a change in the composition
of the default set.
2.6 Conclusions
The implication of our results align with the policy purpose of the threat index as in
Demange (2016). As such since a regulator who has limited intervention potential is
best to target the firm/bank with the greatest threat index, then the main implica-
tion of our result is that at varying level of homogeneous transaction cost, different
firms might meet such criteria whom otherwise would not. Though contagion tend
to grow weaker with frictions, increased risk of initial defaults as consequence of fric-
tions could alter significantly which firm becomes the most desirable for monetary
intervention. Overall, since cash policies are optimally targeted at banks/firms with
greater default impact, frictions could put an otherwise bank of lower importance to
a higher ranking position.
As is noticeable by now, our concept of frictions used so far assumes homogeneity
which is easily not the case in real life. Additional intuitions should be obtainable
from setting a system with heterogeneous transaction cost. Also, the model could
be extended to an inter-temporal setting where firms might anticipate frictions and
adopt prudential behaviours can be considered. Here, assuming such frictions remain
exogenous to the firm, it is concerned with such friction to the extent it might lead to
it defaulting to its creditors. This would have a lot to do with default punishment as
well as a dynamic model to capture forecast trends that might predict the introduc-
tion of frictions to the payment system. lastly, we do fail to capture transaction cost
as a product of market equilibrium decision between firms and financial intermedi-
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aries. We believe that further work on this aspect has the prospect of improving our
knowledge on firms interactions and decisions given such market induced transaction
cost.
2.7 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2.3.1
With (2.2), we have 𝜋𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 = min
{︁








which still follows the
Knaster-Tarski fixed point theorem such that if we use ∧ to denote "the least be-
tween": the monotone mapping f : 𝜋𝑜𝑢𝑡 → (z + (1 − 𝛿)𝐺𝑇𝜋𝑜𝑢𝑡) ∧ L
1−𝛿 of a complete
lattice [0, L
1−𝛿 ] → [0,
L
1−𝛿 ] consists of greater an least fixed points (𝜋
𝑜𝑢𝑡, and 𝜋𝑜𝑢𝑡).
And since the set [0, L
1−𝛿 ] has the property that it is both convex, compact and f is
a continuous mapping, the existence of fixed point still follows the classical Brouwer
fixed point theorem. Uniqueness of a clearing payment vector implies the greater
and least 𝜋𝑜𝑢𝑡 are equal to each other as such 𝜋𝑜𝑢𝑡+ = 𝜋𝑜𝑢𝑡−. This is the case all
firms affected by debtor firms are a surplus set (hence, atleast on of such firm has
a positive initial cash value, i.e, given a cyclical network 𝑛, 1′𝑛z𝑛 >> 0. ). This is
always the case as long as a sink node exists because intuitively, it is a creditor firm
with no obligation and so fare as
∑︀
𝑖∈𝒩 𝑧𝑖 > 0, then the net value of the sink node is
greater than zero.
Since (1−𝛿) is infused into a uniquely clearing EN model, then we recall that the
EN clearing is likened to a game of strategic complimentarity as in Ballester, Calvó-
Armengol, and Zenou (2006) such that (I−𝐺𝑇 ) is positive definite such as to guaran-
tee uniquely defined payment vector without friction. Let 𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐺𝑇 ) be the maximum
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we then have (1 − 𝛿) ∈ ]0, 1[ and 𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐺
𝑇+𝐺
2






clearing payment is always unique as transaction cost always satisfies such criteria.

Proof of Lemma 2.3.1
Recall the first iteration of the payments in the fictitious default sequence assumes
that ∀ firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝑛, 𝜋𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 = L𝑖 and as such the total transaction cost absorbed based
on that assumption is 𝛿
∑︀𝑛
𝑖=1 L𝑖.
But then the reason for a higher iteration is because of the existence of firms who
default in the first wave. We group firms into default and no default categories by
using the operator given as:
𝜓𝑖(𝜅) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ 1 if firm 𝑖, up to the 𝜅
𝑡ℎ − 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, is a defaulter , and
0 otherwise.
Then the total value of transaction cost for leaving the system based on the second













So that up until clearing, the adjusted level of transaction cost over all iterations













(1 − 𝜓𝑖(𝜅− 1))L𝑖(𝜅− 1) + 𝛿
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
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Proof of Proposition 2.3.1





payment and as such, lower transaction cost.
As such Equity is strictly increasing with respect to 𝜋𝑜𝑢𝑡 and as such order pre-
serving/strictly monotone. The implication on a closed walk graph 𝐺1(𝒩1, 𝑔) is that
since
∑︀
𝑖∈𝑛 𝑒𝑞𝑖(𝑘 = 𝑛) −
∑︀






𝑖 ), it then means
that
∑︀








𝑖∈𝑛 𝑒𝑞𝑖(𝑘 = 0). Recall also that
because 𝜋𝑜𝑢𝑡 satisfies the Eisenberg and Noe (2001) limited liability condition, then






𝑖 ) is strictly positive. This means then that∑︀
𝑖∈𝑛 𝑒𝑞𝑖(𝑘 = 𝑛) < 0 ⇐⇒ | − 𝑣𝑒
∑︀







Proof of Lemma 2.5.1
Recall that networks contains sink nodes. This is such that if we have a default set
𝐷 given the entire network set 𝒩 , then it is the case that 𝒟 ≠ 𝒩 even when possible
loops default. Also, because there is atleast a sink node, then atleast a firm in the
𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑝(𝐷) defaults to a non-defaulting firm such that ∃𝑖 ∈ 𝒟 such that
∑︀
𝑗∈𝒟 𝑔𝑖𝑗 < 1.
This then implies that 𝐺𝒟×𝒟 · 1𝒟 << 1𝒟 and 𝐺(𝑝)𝒟×𝒟 · 1𝒟 << 1𝒟 where 𝑝 = 1, 2, . . ..
Additionally, the spectral radius 𝜌(𝐺𝒟×𝒟), 𝜌(𝐺2𝒟×𝒟) . . . are all less than 1(See
Demange Appendix on proof). This is also the same as in 𝜌(𝐺𝑇𝒟×𝒟) because atleast
the row(s) belonging to the value receivable are always less than 1. And since 𝛿 ∈
[0, 1], then (1 − 𝛿)𝐺𝑇𝒟×𝒟 where 𝛿 > 0 can only reduce the value of the 𝑔’s and as
such, is just as invertible. 
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Proof of Theorem 2.5.1
So we have the parameter 𝜇(𝒟, 𝛿) = ((I− (1 − 𝛿) ·𝐺𝒟×𝒟)−1) · 1. Let us start by











𝒟×𝒟 + . . .
)︀
· 1. (2.11)
Recall that following theorem 2.5.1, (I − 𝐺𝒟×𝒟) is invertible for the following
reasons already given in the proof of theorem 2.5.1. Now since it is already proven
that the sum of rows in 𝐺𝒟×𝒟 is strictly < 1 , then we know through power series
that higher exponents of 𝐺𝒟×𝒟 imply lower values of each elements and as such,
lower row sums. This is so that if 𝛿 > 0 then we have,
𝜇(𝒟, 𝛿) =
(︀
I + (1 − 𝛿) ·𝐺𝒟×𝒟 + (1 − 𝛿)2 ·𝐺2𝒟×𝒟 + (1 − 𝛿)3 ·𝐺3𝒟×𝒟 + . . .
)︀
·1 (2.12)
And as 𝛿 is also strictly less than 1, then it means that the higher order parts die out
even faster such that as 𝛿 → 1, (1− 𝛿) ·𝐺𝒟×𝒟 dominates all other parts and as such
the rank of the threat index is purely based on 𝜇(𝒟, 𝛿) = (I + (1 − 𝛿) ·𝐺𝒟×𝒟) ·1. 
Proof of Proposition 2.5.1
Take a firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒮 when 𝛿 = 0 with the clearing function given earlier as in (2.3)
as 𝜋𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 = min
{︁











𝑗 → 0 while 𝑧𝑖 remains constant. And as 𝑧𝑖 is clearly defined and less
than ∞, then ∞ − 𝑧𝑖 > 0 so that firm 𝑖 is no longer able to meet up its liability,
hence, 𝒮 ∪ 𝒟 = 𝒟 such that all debtor are now in the default set. 
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Strategic Interactions in Financial
Networks
3.1 Introduction
Financial behaviours can be studied in several ways including interactions which are
a function of the link between parties(firms) involved. Links commonly modeled
are those which captures contractual obligation of one party which represents an
asset to the other party. Because a contract can only be created by the mutual
consent of the two potential firms involved, links project such attributes among a
host of properties. Also with these links comes exposure. Sometimes these exposure
could be advantageous to firms for example in a firms ability to external shocks and
promotion of stability (Elliott, Golub, & Jackson, 2014). However, where these links
are binding and difficult to sever, they could be a source of negative spillover to one
or more firms.
We explore endogenous interest(lending) rate determination in fixed lending/bor-
rowing network where firms account for administrative overheads associated with
levels of total lending and a percentage of borrowing. Inter-firm lending rate, as core
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of the contract clause, is the additional amount over a period of time to which a
lending firm charges a borrowing firm for such transaction. In this case, firms give
significant attention to cost arising from its debt management procedure. It is not
a novel observation that the vast amount of businesses engage in credit financing.
Many of such businesses have both creditors (suppliers, banks etc) as well as debtors
(customers,retailers, etc). In order to effectively keep track and ensure a smooth
settling process, administrative resources are then devoted towards different aspects
of such overall loans. One major assumption we make is to relate the total amount
of loans1 to total administrative cost. The intuition here remains that large amount
of loans implies large volume of transaction to which raises risk of significant amount
of loss to both the personnel2 involved and the business at large. Such delicate na-
ture then spurs the need for remuneration to match up to such risk, hence greater
expenses. Other types of market frictions could also add to this cost. This is so that
assuming a single clearing period, all liabilities are settled such that the lending firm
regains its cash and some premium.
As a main result, we show that the optimal lending rate a firm charges to its
debtors is on derived from a game of strategic substitution. such substitution be-
haviours are in line with major public goods in network literature such as Bramoullé,
Kranton, and D’amours (2014), Allouch (2015), etc. We then show that Nash equi-
librium exists and is uniquely defined in pure strategies given our network game. We
then discuss special equilibrium properties in networks such as the Core-periphery
network which are specifically well bounded. We find that core firms are closely de-
pendent on links from other core firms while giving less priority to periphery firms.
Periphery firms on the other hand substitute from rates charged by their core inter-
links.
Adopting a utilitarian welfare approach, we show welfare neutrality of firms,
1We discount those from creditors as we show later in the model.
2Accountant, Debt Administrator, Legal teams, etc.
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whose equilibrium lending rate is positive, to intermediation policies. Given such
neutrality, we hold that Pareto improvement of welfare can be achieved at zero cost
to Planner by leaking out little amount from the paying system (such that active
firms are fixed) and proportionally splitting it so as to subside for loan management
expenses. Lastly, we then show quality of firms least externality based centrality is
vital for targeting firms with subsidy policies.
Related Literature
Rates agreed upon by such parties become an asset in that they contribute potentially
to profit of firms from an inter-firm lending in a given trading period. Sometime
these rates are determined based on set regulatory benchmarks, for example in case
of banks premiums are added to the inter-banks offered rate (e.g Libor as shown
by Eisl, Jankowitsch, and Subrahmanyam (2017), Coulter, Shapiro, and Zimmerman
(2017), Duffie and Dworczak (2014), Abrantes-Metz, Kraten, Metz, and Seow (2012)
and Eaglesham (2013)). There might be other benchmark at typical firms level which
for example might be the risk-free interest rate used in CAPM analysis. We however
pay less attention to such parameter. Instead we focus on situations where by firms
primarily make decisions as to their lending rate. An existing work in this is found in
Aldasoro, Gatti, and Faia (2017) which models an endogenous interest premium in
a system in which firms given potential cascading defaults/systemic risk. Hence, the
additional premium is determined while accounting for estimated default probability.
Earlier discussion has made reference to strategic interactions and more sepcif-
ically, a substitution relationship. Strategic interdependence here can be traced to
network properties of our debtors and/or creditor firms as a form of financial net-
work. Most financial network literature such as Morris (2000), Morris and Shin
(2001), Allen and Babus (2008), Babus (2016), Bhattacharya, Gale, Barnett, and
Singleton (1985) have focused on systemic risk as well as other issues to do with risk
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contagion and financial network stability e.g Caballero and Simsek (2013), Cabrales,
Gottardi, and Vega-Redondo (2014), Nier, Yang, Yorulmazer, and Alentorn (2007),
Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015), Greenwood, Landier, and Thesmar
(2015)(on banks), Galeotti, Ghiglinoy, and Goyal (2016), König, Tessone, and Zenou
(2009), Bilkic, Gries, et al. (2014), Gollier, Koehl, and Rochet (1997), etc. Others
on network influence and power as in Demange (2016) as well as Aldasoro and An-
geloni (2015) while a host of literature pay attention to liquidation as well as network
financing such as Allouch and Jalloul (2016), Amini, Filipović, and Minca (2016),
Feinstein (2017), Rogers and Veraart (2013) and Elsinger, Lehar, and Summer (2006)
to mention but a few. However, it is noted that since systemic risk and stability is
the key focus of most of the works mentioned above, strategic interaction plays less
importance.
Additionally, little attempt have been given to link interactions in debt networks
to public good games which yields best replies revealing strategic substitution. How-
ever, those on contagion in the previous par graph rely on strategic complements.
Public good games with strategic substitution are found in in Allouch (2015) and
Allouch and King (2018a)(which shows equilibrium in a fully bounded action pro-
file). Also importantly is Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) and Bramoullé et al. (2014)
where by interaction mostly based on strategic substitution is identified. Such games
of public good provision and more specifically private public good provision can ma-
terialize in different ways in financial networks. That being said, the underlying
ideas has not been aimed at identifying such behaviors in financial network games.
A contrast of this work from seminal works including Bramoullé and Kranton (2007)
and Allouch (2015) is the close attention paid to interactions to undirected network
(with Bramoullé et al. (2014) providing initial intuitions as to weighted and direct
network). While there are observable differences, intuitions are very useful in ob-
serving such behaviors in financial networks which are uni-directional and weighted
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in nature.
Our results on neutrality is also in distinction to neutrality of income redistribu-
tion. For income redistribution, neutrality holds such that wealth transfer between
active agents in a public good game leads to no change in aggregate public good
provision and individual consumption. These forms of neutrality is discussed well in
Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986), Wells (2004) as well as Allouch (2015) though
we point out that our intervention are not particularly redistributive in nature. lastly,
our targeting criterion has a lot of similarities to works like key player concepts in
works like Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou (2006), Galeotti, Golub, and Goyal
(2020), Belhaj, Bervoets, and Deroïan (2016) as well as Belhaj and Deroïan (2019).
3.2 The Model
Assume a three period economy consisting of ?̂? = {1, . . . , 𝑛} set of firms. We denote
the set of periods denoted as 𝒯 such that 𝒯 = {𝑡− 1, 𝑡, 𝑡+ 1}. For every firm 𝑖 ∈ ?̂? ,
its neighborhood is denoted as 𝒩𝑖 and 𝒩𝑖 = {𝒩 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 ∪𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖 } ⊂ ?̂? where 𝒩 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 represents
firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ’s debtors and 𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖 represents firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ’s creditors. Debtors are those
whom a firm lends to and creditors are who the firm loans from. The amount to be
borrowed by each firm 𝑖 ∈ ?̂? is given as 𝑏𝑖 : 𝑏𝑖 > 0 ∀ 𝑖 ∈ ?̂? . This interaction forms
a borrowing network 𝐺(?̂? , 𝑔) with 𝑔 representing links between firms.
Each firm strictly lends to each other based on the network 𝐺(?̂? , 𝑔) in 𝑡 and
as such 𝐺(?̂? , 𝑔) indicate borrowing/lending contract in this model. The network
𝐺(?̂? , 𝑔) is set at 𝑡 − 1 ∈ 𝒯 so that it is exogenous to period 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 1. At 𝑡 + 1




𝑔𝑗𝑖 = 1 and
∑︀
𝑗∈𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖
𝑔𝑗𝑖𝑏𝑖 = 𝑏𝑖. A firm while lending charges
an extra amount it sets at 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯 denoted as 𝑟𝑖. This rate 𝑟𝑖 remains fixed for the
rest of 𝒯 once set. Also, we assume that firms then incur additional cost to manage
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debtors and creditors accounts and repayment procedures which we capture under
loan management cost.




𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑏𝑗, ∀ 𝑖 ∈ ?̂? . (3.1)
A sample balance sheet at 𝑡+ 1 for any firm in ?̂? is represented in the table below;
Table 3.1: Firms balance Sheet at 𝑡+ 1
Assets Amount Liability Amount
Debtors 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 Creditors 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
Profit 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
So then assume a firm 𝑖 ∈ ?̂? who is scheduled at 𝑡 to lend to as well as borrow
from other firms within the same system (Thus creating incoming and/or outgoing
links). Then profit for the firm 𝑖 ∈ ?̂? intuitively drawn from its balance sheet marks











Figure 3-1: A Bounded Borrowing Network:
Arrows (edges) point to direction of borrowers and originate from lenders.
We observe that the firm 𝑖 ∈ ?̂? is only concerned about his lenders and borrowers
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Figure 3-2: Decomposed Network to capture pivotal links. We see that for decision making
purpose, it is direct incoming and outgoing link that are useful to firms decision. This is
as Loan management cost is spent mainly through managing a firms asset/liabilities.
as opposed to the entire network. Since we ignore default risk it then implies that
regardless of the nature of borrowing network, each firm 𝑖 can identify its position
given a star which carries its lenders and borrowers.
Take an example of a system ?̂? = {𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘, 𝑙} as in fig. 3-1. Observe also, the
break down in 𝑓𝑖𝑔. 3− 2. It shows that from any directed network of borrowing and
lending, for example the network in 𝑓𝑖𝑔. 3−1, relevant sub-networks can be derived.
Such sub-networks as in 𝑓𝑖𝑔. 3 − 2 captures each individual firm 𝑖 ∈ ?̂? lending and
borrowing.
To translate this into a firm 𝑖 ∈ ?̂? payoff, we additionally assume each firm
𝑖 ∈ ?̂? has included in its cost, loan management/administrative expenses. This
loan management cost is split into 2 main parts. The first a homogeneous constant
𝜅 which measures the level of efficiency in managing overall debtors and creditors
accounts and recovery process. In itself, a higher 𝜅 implies lesser efficiency in loan
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management while a lesser 𝜅 implies greater efficiency. Such efficiency could arise
from specialization, technical know-how, technological progress and other factors that
imply positive economies of scale for the firm. The second part is the endogenous
loan size parameter which we denote as 𝜇𝑖 for the given firm 𝑖 ∈ ?̂? . More formally,
we define 𝜇𝑖∈?̂? as follows;
𝜇𝑖(𝑟𝑖, 𝑟−𝑖∈𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖 ) = 𝑏−𝑖
∙ 𝑟𝑖 + 𝑎
∑︁
𝑗∈𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖
𝑟𝑗 (𝑔𝑗𝑖𝑏𝑖) , (3.2)
where the parameter 𝑎 ∈ R+ captures the degree to which interest from debtors
increases administrative cost. Let r = (𝑟𝑖)𝑖∈𝒩 ∈ R𝑛+ be the lending rate vector for
firms, we assume that the firm 𝑖 ∈ ?̂? has the following variable loan management
cost;
𝜅 ∙ f (𝜇𝑖(𝑟𝑖)) (3.3)
such that we then have the following important assumption;







We assume the mapping 𝑟𝑖 : 𝑟𝑖 → f (𝜇𝑖) is convex due to the fact that we assume
that cost exponentially rises as total variable loan obligation to and from the firm
rises. The (3.3) captures the variable loan management cost which is weighed using
the parameter 𝜅 that would usually assume a very small value. Loan management
cost as defined here includes both the firm 𝑖’s debtors management as well as its
creditors the value ′𝑎′ discounts the total creditor portion.
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3.2.1 Payoffs and Strategic Substitution
We then hold that the firm 𝑖 ∈ ?̂? , f (𝜇𝑖) = (𝜇𝑖)2 which fits well into assumption 3.2.1.
Then the firm 𝑖 ∈ ?̂? , has the following payoff function,
𝑃𝑖(𝑟𝑖|𝑟𝑗, . . .) = 𝑏−𝑖 ∙ 𝑟𝑖 −
∑︁
𝑗∈𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖
𝑟𝑗 (𝑔𝑗𝑖𝑏𝑖) − 𝜅(𝜇𝑖)2. (3.4)
To elaborate, the payoff captures variable components of a firm 𝑖 ∈ ?̂? since for
example, lends out a total of 𝑏−𝑖 and at 𝑡+ 1, gets back 𝑏−𝑖 ∙ (1 + 𝑟𝑖) from its debtors.
So what it gets at 𝑡+ 1 is 𝑏−𝑖 + 𝑏−𝑖𝑟𝑖. Additionally, it pays
∑︀
𝑗∈𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖
(1 + 𝑟𝑗) (𝑔𝑗𝑖𝑏𝑖) to






𝑟𝑗 (𝑔𝑗𝑖𝑏𝑖). We thus
define the firm 𝑖 ∈ ?̂? payoff as one that captures only the parts which are multiples
of the action profile r.
To optimize 𝑃𝑖, the Lagrange equation is given as;
max
𝑟𝑖≥0
𝑄𝑖(𝑟𝑖) = 𝑏−𝑖 ∙ 𝑟𝑖 −
∑︁
𝑗∈𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖
𝑔𝑗𝑖𝑏𝑖 (𝑟𝑗) − 𝜅(𝜇𝑖)2 − 𝜉𝑟𝑖 (3.5)
With the complementary slackness condition 𝜉𝑟𝑖 = 0 from the non-negativity con-
straint of 𝑟𝑖∈?̂? . Then given 𝜉 = 0 satisfies the condition, the first order condition
equates the marginal benefit to marginal cost as shown below;
𝜕𝑄𝑖
𝜕𝑟𝑖




We then make 𝑟𝑖 the subject of the formula using 𝜇𝑖 as in (3.2) so that we have
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∀ 𝑗 ∈ 𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖 , we have;




The linear reaction curve (best reply) for the firm 𝑖 when 𝑟𝑖∈?̂? ∈ [0,R+] is given as;
𝑟𝑖 = max




The lending rate 𝜋𝑖 reflects the autarkic amount charged to each firm 𝑗 such that
𝑗 ∈ 𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖 . firm 𝑖 is desires a greater 𝑟𝑖 if it expects to lend in greater deal compared
to its borrowing and thus submits its rate accordingly. However, the magnitude of
its rate charged depends on its best reply. 𝜋𝑖 additionally reveals the Engels curve
for the firm 𝑖. Also, strategic substitution properties is captured in 𝛿𝑟𝑖
𝛿𝑟𝑗
= −𝑎𝑔𝑗𝑖 for
𝑗 ∈ 𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖 .
Let G = [𝑔𝑗𝑖] be a zero-diagonal matrix and the game arising from (3.8) be
denoted as Γ(G, r, 𝑎) . We make distinction between participating firms and those
who do not participate in Γ(G, r, 𝑎). This is because financial networks could posses
cyclical interconnection as we see in line works within Eisenberg and Noe (2001)
framework. Assume a subset 𝒮 ⊂ ?̂? . We have the formal definition;
Definition 3.2.1. A firm 𝑖 ∈ ?̂? is a sink-node ⇐⇒ 𝒩 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 = {}.
A Sink-node is a debtor to one or more firms but not a creditor to any other firm.
Let the set 𝒩 = {1, . . . , 𝑛} be so that 𝒮 ∪ 𝒩 ⊆ ?̂? and ∀ firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 , 𝒩 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 ̸= {}
and also 𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖 ̸= {} . This distinction is important for example if we have a firm 𝑖
such that 𝒩 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 = {}, then 𝑔𝑗𝑖 = ∞ as 𝑏−𝑖 = 0. It means are unable to define firm 𝑖’s
best reply as it makes no decision. Furthermore, we could have also the firm 𝑖 such
that 𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖 = {}. Let G𝑖 represent the 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ row of the matrix G, we would have
G𝑖 = (0)𝑖∈𝒩 leading to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium 𝑟𝑖 = 𝜋𝑖. This is described as
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strategic dominance as its lending rate is made in isolation. To avoid these instances,
we introduce another important but common concept to directed networks as follows;
Definition 3.2.2. A directed graph 𝐺(𝒩 , 𝑔) is strongly connected (SC) if and
only if for every {0, 𝑛} ∈ 𝒩 , there exist a closed directed walk (the sequence
0, 𝑔01, 1, 𝑔12, . . . , 𝑔𝑛−1,𝑛, 𝑛, 𝑔0,𝑛, 0) from 0 to 0.
Then going further, we will rely on the assumption written below;
Assumption 3.2.2. The graph 𝐺(𝒩 , 𝑔) is strongly connected so that the set ∀ firm
𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 , firm 𝑖 is a strongly connected firm(SCF).
This as such ensures that we avoid dominant equilibrium outcomes or undefined
best replies given sink nodes (for any firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒮, 𝑏−𝑖 = 0 such that 𝑟𝑖 = ∞).
3.3 Pure Strategy Solutions
We define in this section the shape and characteristics of equilibrium under such
game Γ(G, r, 𝑎).
3.3.1 Uniqueness and Stability
We present the existence of the equilibrium and conditions for uniqueness. To support
our next few results, we define a key attribute which is positive definiteness a directed
network as follows;
Definition 3.3.1. Let M be a matrix and 𝜈1(𝑀), . . . , 𝜈𝑛(𝑀) be the eigenvalues of
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This definition is useful given the vast amount of public good in network literature
emphasises symmetric matrix. Let the minimum eigenvalue of a matrix M be denoted
as 𝜈𝑚𝑖𝑛(M), we have the following lemma;







Proof. See Appendix for proof.
We summarize the properties of the equilibrium under Γ(G, r, 𝑎) with the follow-
ing proposition;
Proposition 3.3.1. Given the parameter ′𝑎′ meets the boundary conditions as in
lemma 3.3.1, there always exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for the
game Γ(G, r, 𝑎) and the unique Nash equilibrium is always asymptotically stable.
Proof. From Rosen (1965) concept of diagonal strict concavity, we understand that
a sufficient condition for the payoff 𝑃 (r) to be diagonally strictly concave, then
H(r,1) + H(r,1)𝑇 must be negative definite where H(r,1) is the Jacobian with
respect to r of 𝑃 ′(r). Since it hold that the Jacobian H(r,1) = −(I+𝑎G) , then the
condition is achieve should (I+ 𝑎G) be positive definite which lemma 3.3.1 satisfies.
It is then shown that Nash equilibrium is unique if and only if lemma 3.3.1 is satisfied.
This is so that each firm capture the amount charged by their creditors on bor-
rowings in order to determine the rate charged to debtors without consideration for
their own power.3
3The magnitude to which a firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 rate charged 𝑟𝑖 affects all other firms outcome.
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3.3.2 Analysis of Equilibrium
We denote 𝜋 = (𝜋𝑖)𝑖∈𝒩 ∈ R𝑛+ as the autarkic-rate column vector while r* = (𝑟*𝑖 )𝑖∈𝒩 ∈
R𝑛+ is the Nash equilibrium vector. Following the best reply in (3.8), draw distinction
between active and inactive firms in the definition below.
Definition 3.3.2. A firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 is thus defined as active if and only if 𝑟*𝑖 (𝒩 , 𝑎) ∈
]0,R+] and non-active if 𝑟*𝑖 (𝒩 , 𝑎) = 0 .
Let the set of active firms be denoted with the set 𝒜 ⊆ 𝒩 and hence non-active
firms be 𝒩 −𝒜 ( 𝒩 . Then using intuitions from Bergstrom et al. (1986), Bramoullé
et al. (2014) and more closely, Allouch (2015), we have the following;
Proposition 3.3.2. A set of rates vector r*(𝒜, 𝑎) with active firms 𝒜 ≠ {} is a
Nash equilibrium if and only if the following conditions hold true;
1.







Proof. See Appendix for proof.
The proposition above translates to the fact that firms become non-active when
targets are achieved by simply charging a zero rate and thus, substitute for rates
charged of active firms in such a way that the outcome is the same or is greater
than the outcome from the non-active firms’ autarkic rate charged to debtors. It
also holds then that Nash equilibrium for the game has to include at least one active
firms such that 𝐴 cannot be a null set. We show a simple algorithm in the appendix
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which efficiently computes this equilibrium4. Furthermore, we draw the following
statement from the proposition 3.3.2 as follows;
Corollary 3.3.1. Assume that ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝒜, 𝑏−𝑖 = 𝑏−𝑗 so that 𝜋 = 𝜋 ∙ 1𝒜. This means
that r*(𝒜,−𝑎) = 𝜋 ∙ 𝑏(𝒜,−𝑎) so that ∀ firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒜;
𝑟*𝑖 (G,𝒜, 𝑎) = 𝜋 ∙ 𝛽𝑖(𝒜,−𝑎),
where 𝛽𝑖(𝒜,−𝑎) refers the Bonacich independence index5 or simply independence
index of an active firm 𝑖 implying 𝑏(𝒜,−𝑎) = (𝛽𝑖(𝒜,−𝑎))𝑖∈𝒜 ∈ R𝑛+.
Proof. Because we have the following;
𝑏(𝒜,−𝑎) def= (I + 𝑎G)−1𝒜×𝒜 ∙ 1𝒜. (3.10)
This implies that Nash equilibrium rate is of each firm is directly proportional to
their independence index. The independence index is so named because G = [𝑔𝑗𝑖]
accounts for the strength of incoming links. Also since in the series, (I−𝑎G)𝒜×𝒜 ∙1𝒜
dominates ((I − 𝑎G)𝒜×𝒜 ∙ 𝜋𝒜 dominates the Nash equilibrium r(𝒜,−𝑎)), then the
greater the strength of 𝑔𝑗𝑖 for each firm 𝑖, the lower its 𝛽𝑖(𝒜,−𝑎)]. This then hints
as to which firm 𝑖 charging less amount in lending rate. We explore some special
network properties in relation to this in the next section.
4A simple computational algorithm takes 2|𝒩 | − 1 iterations representing possible combination
of active firms. It is noteworthy that even if we relax assumption 3.2.2 so that ?̂? = {𝒩 ,𝒮},
Equilibrium is simply obtainable by computing for 𝒩 . Hence, for each firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 such that a firm
𝑗 ∈ 𝒮 ∩ 𝒩 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 , then 𝑏−𝑖 = 𝑏𝑖𝑗 + . . .
5So as not to confuse it with Bonacich Centrality which is 𝛽𝑖(G𝑇 , 𝑎) for a firm 𝑖.
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3.3.3 Equilibrium and Inactive Firms
Our proposition 3.3.2 shows that Nash equilibrium could be such that 𝒩 −𝒜 ≠ {}.
A firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 − 𝒜 thus has an 𝑟𝑖 = 0 as its equilibrium rate charged to its debtors.
We draw a swift distinction between inactive firms in our model and the concept of
free-riders found in major public goods in networks papers such as Bramoullé and
Kranton (2007), Bramoullé et al. (2014) as well as Allouch (2015). To understand
this is to understand the best replies given in (3.8) as an outcome of the payoff.
Observe that loan management is a main objective of the firm and as such, strategic
substitution arises in a bid to reduce such management cost. So while a firm who
borrows cannot influence (directly) the rate to which it is charged, it can charge a
corresponding rate to its debtors to balance and optimize loan management expenses.
For this reason, charging a zero rate to debtor thus arises from the fact the present
loan management cost is quite substantial that a positive rate would be even more
harmful to the firm.
The idea here is that an inactive firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 − 𝒜 is not necessarily free-riding
the provision of other firms but on the other hand, is simply avoiding any further
cost as a result of its own decision since its creditors has increased such cost to the
maximum.
3.4 Core-Periphery Networks
We explore in a unique way, further properties of our equilibrium. More specifically
we aim to discuss and show unique network properties of active firms and what the
implication might be in terms of the equilibrium lending rate each firm charges.
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Figure 3-3: Core-periphery network bilateral links between periphery and core sets.
To do this, we examine a stylized case of a network which is shown in fig. 3-5
which contains a core-periphery network where each firm in the core-periphery lends
and borrows to others. Core-periphery network has been widely stylized within the
inter-bank network literature especially within the line of financial contagion and
systemic risk. Recent examples of such studies include Chiu, Eisenschmidt, and
Monnet (2020), Lux, Fricke, et al. (2012), Van Lelyveld et al. (2014) as well as Sui,
Tanna, and Zhou (2020). We describe a core-periphery network as one which has
2 groups of firms, the core firms whose set we denote as 𝐶𝑟 and the periphery set
which we denote as 𝑃𝑟. For a directed graph 𝐺(𝒩 , 𝑔) such that Ω = {𝐶𝑟, 𝑃𝑟} = 𝒩 .
Also, assume 𝒩 (Ω, r*) = 𝒜 such that all firms in the core-periphery network are
actively charging lending rates at equilibrium. The core-periphery network has the
following graph form;
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G(𝐶𝑟, 𝑃𝑟) =
⎡⎢⎣ 𝐶𝑟 × 𝐶𝑟 𝐶𝑟 × 𝑃𝑟





For a network to be deemed core-periphery, it means it can be grouped into the
block partition as shown above.
Assumption 3.4.1 (Block Matrix Properties). Given G(𝐶𝑟, 𝑃𝑟) which is strictly
unidirectional let Ω = {𝐶𝑟, 𝑃𝑟}. We have the following conditions;
1. |𝑃𝑟| = |𝐶𝑟|,
2. G(PP) = 0,
3. G(PC) = 𝜚 ∙ I,
4. G(CP) = 𝜃 ∙ I.
This indicates that we allow for bilateral relationships.6. We are able to compute
the Nash Equilibrium using the block-partition matrix as in (3.11) to compute each
firms Nash Equilibrium:
Proposition 3.4.1. Let 𝐺(Ω, 𝑔) be a directional graph whose topology is core-
periphery in nature. Also assume Ω = {𝐶𝑟, 𝑃𝑟}, 𝜋 = (𝜋𝐶𝑟,𝜋𝑃𝑟)𝑇 and assump-



















6One could possibly argue that bilateral liabilities would not hold given that it can simply be
netted off. However, because each firm makes separate lending rate decision, bilateral links need be
exactly as they are as contractual properties might differ as we show for example in fig. 3-5 where
periphery and core have between them, such bilateral relationships.
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r*𝑃𝑟(G,Ω, 𝑎) = 𝜋𝑃𝑟 − 𝑎𝜚 ∙ r*𝐶𝑟(G,Ω, 𝑎). (3.13)
Proof. See Appendix for proof.
The (3.13) above then provides us with an initial intuition as we can see that for
any firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑟 and a firm 𝑗 ∈ 𝑃𝑟|𝑗 ∈ {𝒩𝑖 ∩ 𝐶𝑟}, then it holds that;
𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑗 ∙ 𝑟
*
𝑖 (G,Ω, 𝑎) + 𝑟
*
𝑗 (G,Ω, 𝑎) = 𝜋𝑗, (3.14)
thus implying a direct strategic substitution relationship between Nash lending
rate decision of each core and its corresponding periphery. The greater the Nash rate
the core charges, the less its corresponding periphery lending rate is and vice versa.
Furthermore, (3.12) shows the core set Nash Equilibrium is then modified into
a measure which includes the value 𝑎
1−𝑎2𝜃𝜚 . This parameter takes the form of a
new attenuation parameter such that it replaces the initial attenuation parameter
𝑎. The new attenuation parameter is greater as 𝑎
1−𝑎2𝜃𝜚 > 𝑎 and since the Bonacich










+. . ., it implies that greater substitution from distant neighbours.
However, this time, the weight of relationship between the core and periphery set
of firms now determines how much of such weight is accounted for in the Nash
equilibrium . To show, since we have that 1 − 𝑎2𝜃𝜚 ↓ if either 𝜃 or 𝜚 rises, then
it means that the link 𝑎
1−𝑎2𝜃𝜚G(CC) is strengthened to such rise in 𝜃 and/or 𝜚 and
weakened when the reverse holds.
Lastly, the density of the core set is accounted for in the matrix G(CC) such that
the diversification of core firms within the core network is crucial in determining the
rate to which the core firms would charge.
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3.4.1 Equitable Partition
We are able to understand further special properties of the core periphery relation
under possible stylized partition network property. We hold the following assumption
for this part of the paper;
Assumption 3.4.2. Given Ω = {𝐶𝑟, 𝑃𝑟}, we hold that G(CC) ∙ 1 = 𝜌 ∙ 1, while
G(PC) = 𝜚 ∙ I and G(CP) = 𝜃 ∙ I for 𝜌, 𝜚, 𝜃 ∈ ]0,R++].
This yields a core-periphery network which has both out-equitable and in-
equitable properties as defined using Kada (2020) as well as Deng, Sato, and Wu
(2007) as follows;
Definition 3.4.1 (Equitable Partition). Consider Ω = {𝐶𝑟, 𝑃𝑟} where G(CC) ∙1 =
𝜌 ∙1 and G(PP) ∙1 = 0 ∙1 arising from G(PP) = 0 (from assumption 3.4.1) so that
𝐶𝑟 and 𝑃𝑟 are Partitions. If we have that G(PC) = 𝜚 ∙ I and G(CP) = 0 ∙ I then
Ω is ’out-equitable’ while if we have that G(CP) = 𝜃 ∙ I and G(PC) = 0 ∙ I, then Ω
is ’in-equitable’. Where both G(PC) = 𝜚 ∙ I and G(CP) = 𝜃 ∙ I holds simultaneously
then Ω is simply an ’Equitable’ partition.
Since core network are directed ring-network, observe the examples as in fig. 3-5a
as well as a complete bi-directional core-network shown in fig. 3-6b. Also from the
fig. 3-6 , observe that all but fig. 3-5b are partitioned cores7 as each core-firm has
same amount of incoming and outgoing link in each case.
7For example, 𝜌 = 1 for fig. 3-5a, 𝜌 = 2 in fig. 3-6a while 𝜌 = 3 in fig. 3-6b. Because G(CC) ∙1 =
(2, 1, 1, 2)𝑇 for fig. 3-5b, we are unable to define 𝜌 in such case.
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(d) Complete Core Network.
Figure 3-4: Sample Core Networks. The figure a, c and d involve cores with fit the
partition criteria.
We begin with an added assumption which satisfies both the ring core-network,
core network with regular ring properties based on proposition 3.4.1 to show some
realization in the following statement below;
Proposition 3.4.2. Let G bi-directional graph of SCF which are core-periphery in
nature as in Ω = {𝐶𝑟, 𝑃𝑟} and assumption 3.4.2 holds. In so far as ′𝑎′ is within
threshold, we have the following Nash Equilibrium;
r*𝐶𝑟(G,Ω, 𝑎) = (1 + 𝑎𝜌− 𝑎2𝜃𝜚)−1(𝜋𝐶𝑟 − 𝑎𝜃𝜋𝑃𝑟),
r*𝑃𝑟(G,Ω, 𝑎) = 𝜋𝑃𝑟 − 𝑎𝜚 ∙ r*𝐶𝑟(G,Ω, 𝑎),
(3.15)
Proof. See Appendix for proof.
This is such that if 𝜋 = 𝜋 ∙ 1, each within a partition charges identical lending
rates. Observe further intuitions from this proposition,
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Remark 3.4.1. If 𝜋 = 𝜋 ∙ 1 and 𝜃 = 𝜚, the expression 𝑟*𝑃𝑟(G,Ω, 𝑎) > 𝑟*𝐶𝑟(G,Ω, 𝑎)
always holds true in so far 𝜌 > 0.
The remark above points to the fact that if a borrowing network meets the criteria
for core-periphery relationship where links between each periphery and its core are
identical and each firm lends same total amount, then one can presume core firms
would charge a lower lending rate as compared to the peripheries.
To discuss more on the condition that G(CC) ∙ 1 = 𝜌 ∙ 1 in assumption 3.4.2, we
illustrate this in the examples below;
Example 3.4.1. Assuming the following networks with homogeneous links such that












(b) Irregular Core Network
Figure 3-5: Core Network with homogeneous links.
We have the sub-matrix of core interconnections as;
G1(CC) = 𝛼
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 G2(CC) = 𝛼
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
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G1(CC) ∙ 1|𝐶𝑟| = G2(CC) ∙ 1|𝐶𝑟| = 𝛼(2, 2, 2, 2, 2)
𝑇
This implies that,
G1(CC)/Ω = G2(CC)/Ω = 𝜌 = 𝛼 ∙ 2

























(b) Directed Core Network.
Figure 3-6: Core Networks with heterogeneous links.
We have the sub-matrix of core interconnections as;
G1(CC) =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 0 0.4 0.4
0.8 0 0 0
0 0.8 0 0
0 0 0.8 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 G2(CC) =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 0 0.4 0.8
0.8 0 0 0
0 0.8 0 0
0 0 0.4 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
G1(CC) ∙ 1|𝐶𝑟| = (0.8, 0.8, 0.8, 0.8)
𝑇 ,
G2(CC) ∙ 1|𝐶𝑟| = (0.8, 0.8, 1.2, 0.4)
𝑇 .
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This implies that,
G1(CC)/Ω = 𝜌 = 0.8
G2(CC)/Ω =??
As such the core network in fig. 3-6b does not satisfy the assumption 3.4.2.
3.5 Intervention and Welfare Policies
In this section, we define outcomes based on Nash lending rates and then observe
welfare properties of the model. More precisely, we highlight various possible policy
initiative to which a maximising Planner could adopt and its estimate the overall
impact. To study welfare, we adopt the standard utilitarian approach. As such, we
introduce the following definition;
Definition 3.5.1. The welfare from the game Γ(G, r, 𝑎) is defined specially for firms
who charge a positive amount as;




This implies we use welfare is the aggregate payoff of all firms who charge a
positive amount. To define such payoff, we write the following lemma;
Lemma 3.5.1. Assume 𝒩 and the game Γ(G, r, 𝑎), ∀ firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒜, payoff given Nash
equilibrium is as follows;
P𝒜 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(B) ∙
(︀















are both column vectors.
Proof. See Appendix for proof.
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It is important to note the implication of (3.17). We see here that firms utility for
charging is mainly dependent on their individual Nash equilibrium rate. This means
that if we were to observe (3.17) and our best reply in (3.5) we then have an idea of
kinds of policy implications for the model which we explore in the coming sections.
3.5.1 Transaction Cost and Welfare Neutrality
In this part, we explore the possibility of intervention policies and their welfare
impact. Usually in payment systems, movement of a cash could face barriers such
as foreign exchange conversion cost (if 2 firms are located at different economic
regions), transaction cost like bank charges, etc. If we assume a system where firms
incur transaction cost on total payment which we denote as 𝜆, let us have a case
where a regulator decides to grant 𝜆𝑏−𝑖 to each 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 , such policies are done so far
as they keep the active set 𝒜 the same which means the network graph G𝒜 should
remain unchanged, unchanged. Given 𝜆𝑏−𝑖 for all firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 . The initial mark of
the policy 𝜆 is such that payoff is written as;
𝑃 𝜆𝑖 (𝑟𝑖) = 𝜆
⎛⎝𝑏−𝑖 ∙ 𝑟𝑖 − ∑︁
𝑗∈𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖
(𝑔𝑗𝑖𝑏𝑖) 𝑟𝑗
⎞⎠− 𝜅 (𝜆𝜇𝑖)2 (3.18)
The diagram fig. 3-7 shows a Planner 𝑃 whose objective is to maximise
∑︀
𝑖∈𝒜 𝑃𝑖.
More specifically, the fig. 3-7a represents and instance where a Planner increases
payment made by each firm to another (for example, through elimination of a pre-
vailing transaction cost like bank charges) while the fig. 3-7b shows a case where even
without friction, the Planner grants each lender an extra amount to loan its potential
debtors given strictly that debtors are not opposed to such additional loans. The
arrows show the policy action. In terms of equilibrium, we introduce the following
lemma;
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Lemma 3.5.2. The active set 𝒜 remains fixed ∀ 𝜆 ≶ 1 even though r𝜆 = 𝜆−1 ∙ r.


















This is so that rewriting in vector form, our Nash for active firms is given as;




= 𝜆−1 ∙ r𝒜.
For this set combination 𝒜 and 𝒩 − 𝒜 to not be the Nash equilibrium set would
mean that the following has to hold;
𝑎
𝜆




However, multiplying the equation above by 𝜆 gives the condition as;
𝑎G𝒩−𝒜×𝒜 ∙ r𝒜 < 𝜋𝒩−𝒜,
Which is a contradiction to the original equilibrium of 𝑎G𝒩−𝒜×𝒜r𝒜 ≥ 𝜋𝒩−𝒜.
Some explanation of this lemma is that since transaction cost 𝜆 is homogeneous
and since inactive firms are such that 𝑎G𝒩−𝒜×𝒜 ∙ r𝜆𝒜 ≥ 𝜋𝜆𝒩−𝒜, then it means that
while it is that 𝑟𝜆𝑖∈𝒜 = 𝜆−1𝑟𝑖, it is also the case that 𝜋𝜆𝑖∈𝒩−𝒜 = 𝜆𝜋𝑖. So if because 𝜋
rises and falls at equal magnitude for each firm, set of active firms remains constant.
As such the magnitude of transaction cost or intermediate intervention is not relevant
in terms of what the composition of active set would be at Nash equilibrium. In that
light, we summarise the effect of such homogeneous intervention policy as follows;
Proposition 3.5.1. Given the homogeneous policy 𝜆, ∆𝑊 (r𝜆,𝒜, 𝑎) = 0, hence wel-
fare is neutral.
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(b) Intervention in a system
without existing frictions.
Figure 3-7: Directions of a Planner 𝑃 ’s intervention to 4 firms
We then move to observe the impact of mutually exclusive policy 𝜆𝑖𝑏−𝑖 ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝒜
such that 𝜆𝑖 S 𝜆𝑗 for all 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝒜. Observe here that policies are restricted to active
set, we assume strictly that such policy intervention is such that leaves active set
unchanged. For simplicity, one can initially assume the policy 𝜆𝑖 is applied to a
single firm while holding others fixed as shown in fig. 3-8 where this time a regulator
increases only one firms borrowing . In practice, it could be through eliminating













Figure 3-8: Ring network with 4 firms where a regulator decides to increase total firm 𝑖’s
lending to 𝜆𝑖𝑏−𝑖.
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More broadly, the concept of the policy is that links of firms could be increased
at heterogeneous proportion. The impact of such policy on welfare goes as follows;
Theorem 3.5.1. Given a policy (𝜆𝑖, 𝜆𝑗, . . .) so that 𝜆𝑖 S 𝜆𝑗 for all 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝒜 we have
the following outcome;
∆𝑊 𝜆(r𝜆,𝒜, 𝑎) = 0 (3.20)
Hence such policy is welfare neutral.
Proof. See Appendix for proof.
This means that it is not possible for a regulator to improve the welfare of active
players by simply increasing/reducing one or more active firm network intensity even
if it is by varying amounts. Welfare Neutral policies are also found in major public
literature such as Bergstrom et al. (1986) and Warr (1983) who both showed neutral-
ity to aggregate provision of public good and individual consumption of private good
in so far as wealth redistribution does not change the set of active players involved.
In an extension to this, Allouch (2015) adds that small transfers that leave active set
the same are also neutral only when such transfers are made between the active set
themselves. To contrast with our results yield neutrality without transfer policies.
Because each firms utility is based on their individual Nash equilibrium, payoffs are
neutral which leaves overall welfare unchanged. Additionally, intervention are not
be restricted to active firms and due to the homogeneous nature of intervention, the
magnitude of 𝜆 is pertinent in influencing the outcome in so far rates charged by
creditor firms are limited to non-negative rates.
3.5.2 Resource Allocation
To access a possible impact of theorem 3.5.1, we observe a policy change of ∆ 𝜅𝑖
for 𝑖 ∈ 𝒜 (i.e, firms who charge at Nash equilibrium ). Let us have the following
definition;
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Definition 3.5.2. For any firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 , we have it that
• Subsidy ⇒ Δ𝜅𝑖
𝜅𝑖
= 𝛾−𝑖
• Tax burden ⇒ Δ𝜅𝑖
𝜅𝑖
= 𝛾+𝑖
Assume then that 𝛾𝑖 = 𝛾 ∀ firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒜 so that the policy is applied in homogeneous
proportion to all active firms. Payoff of each firm 𝑖 is written as;
∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑃 𝛾𝑖 (𝑟𝑖) = 𝑏−𝑖 ∙ 𝑟𝑖 −
∑︁
𝑗∈𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖
(𝑔𝑗𝑖𝑏𝑖) 𝑟𝑗 − (1 + 𝛾)𝜅(𝜇𝑖)2 (3.21)
We summarise the effect in the following results;
Lemma 3.5.3. Given 𝛾, welfare differential is as follows;




Remark 3.5.1. This implies that if 𝛾 ∈ [−1, 0[, then ∆𝑊 𝛾(r𝛾,𝒜, 𝑎) > 0 while if
𝛾 ∈ [0, 1[ then ∆𝑊 𝛾(r𝛾,𝒜, 𝑎) < 0 and its interpretation is simply that subsidies
improves welfare while taxes reduce welfare.
Note that Active firms 𝒜 also remains fixed ∀ 𝛾 ∈ ]0, 1[. Results in this case are
clearly unsurprising as lighter burden means firms are less sensitive to the volume
of indebtedness given its fixed debt. Examples of such policies could be through
providing outsourcing facility to a portion of debts or maybe policies to reduce call
rates or providing free training of labour force involved in such area. When however,
this policy applies in a heterogeneous manner to firms, it then becomes isomorphic
to resource transfers which we explore in details subsequently.
In lemma 3.5.2 as well as theorem 3.5.1, it is noted that given a policy 𝜆𝑖 ≶ 1
such that lending becomes 𝜆𝑖𝑏−1 for any 𝑖 ∈ 𝒜, ∆𝑊 (G, 𝑎) = 0 in so far as the active
firms 𝒜 remains fixed. Given our results above, we have the following results;
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Proposition 3.5.2. Given the game Γ(G,𝒜, 𝑎) there exists ∆𝑊 (r,𝒜, 𝛾, 𝜆) ∈
]0,R++[ (not necessarily Pareto) at zero cost to a Planner in so far as there exists∑︀
𝑖∈𝒜 𝜆𝑖𝑏−𝑖 such that 𝒜 remains fixed.
Proof. Strictly holding 𝒜 fixed, let
∑︀
𝑖∈𝒜(1 − 𝜆𝑖)𝑏−1 be the amount the regulator
charges for intermediate payments from each firm 𝑖 (building from proposition 3.5.1)





2) which then guarantees
Pareto improvement among active firms. For non-Pareto improvement, subsidised
administrative cost 𝛾𝑖𝜅𝑖(∙)2 need not apply to all firms in 𝒜. In this case, the criteria
shown in theorem 3.6.1 becomes useful.
This comes from the fact that so far as active set remains fixed, the regulator
can instead of eliminating transaction cost, create one at no cost to overall welfare.
This also grants resources to subsidise one or more firms in a way that improves
welfare. Pareto improvement is possible if 𝑋 =
∑︀




2 ≤ 𝑋. Observe now that 𝛾 is constant so that its effect on welfare
corresponds to lemma 3.5.3. This is a unique form of transfer compared to those
found in mainstream public good in networks literature such as Allouch (2015),
Allouch and King (2018b), etc. This is because in this case, transfers could be
simply from one firm to another through different variables the firm faces.
3.6 Intervention Targeting
We project in this section the relationship between Bonacich externality measures
and firms quality, especially in terms of marginal welfare given a resource constrained
Planner. We here generalise the Planner to one who wishes to grant loan management
cost subsidy in order to maximise overall welfare (∆𝑊 𝛾(r𝛾,𝒜, 𝑎))𝑚𝑎𝑥 of active firms
𝒜 . Then if the set Φ(𝒜) represents the possible combinations of firms, the Planner
has |Φ(𝒜)| = 2|𝒜| − 1 amount of alternative actions as to the distribution of subsidy
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intervention in order to achieve (∆𝑊 𝛾(r𝛾,𝒜, 𝑎))𝑚𝑎𝑥. This is such that the earlier
discussed "𝛾 ∀ firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒜" is a strategy element in Φ(𝒜) arising from the 𝐶(|𝒜|, |𝒜|)
combination, where 𝐶(𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝑎!
(𝑎−𝑏)!𝑏! . On the other extreme, let 𝜑 ⊂ Φ be the subset
arising the combination 𝐶(|𝒜|, 1), This then means that |𝜑| = |𝒜| such that the
Planner calculates the total welfare from subsidising for a single firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒜. We then
wish to show the qualities of the firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒜 which yields the greatest payoff from the
strategy subset 𝜑. Literature in recent times have, within network spillover problems
come up with various targeting criterion; The Key-Player concept introduced in
Ballester et al. (2006), The highest threat index (which is the Bonacich centrality)
introduced in Demange (2016) as well as the top Principal Components as another
eigenvalue related measure used in Galeotti et al. (2020).
We begin with a naive scenario. Assume a Planner with unlimited finance but
one who wishes to subsidise administrative cost by a 𝛾 amount a single selected firm
so as to maximise overall network welfare. Formally, we define the Planners problem
within the strategy 𝜑 ⊂ Φ is stated as;
max
𝛾
{𝑃 𝛾𝑖 − 𝑃𝑖|𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛} 𝑠.𝑡 𝛾− = 𝛾𝑖|𝑖 ∈ {𝒜}. (3.23)
The choice firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒜 then has a payoff is written as;
𝑃 𝛾𝑖 (𝑟𝑖) =
⎛⎝𝑏−𝑖 ∙ 𝑟𝑖 − ∑︁
𝑗∈𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖
(𝑔𝑗𝑖𝑏𝑖) 𝑟𝑗
⎞⎠− (1 + 𝛾)𝜅(𝜇𝑖)2 (3.24)
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Figure 3-9: Ring network with 4 firms to which the Planner makes a decision which to
subsidise.
Hence the question is which firm should the Planner subsidise for? Observe the





















above is related to the Bonacich centrality used to capture prestige and network
influence as proposed by Bonacich (1987). However, it measures the weakness of
firms link to its debtors. This means that the greater 𝛽𝑖(G𝑇 ,−𝑎) is for a firm 𝑖, the
smaller the weight of the direct link to 𝒩 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 . Going further, 𝛽𝑖(G𝑇 ,−𝑎) is referred
to as the externality index for firm 𝑖. We as such present the following results.
Theorem 3.6.1. Assume that 𝑏−𝑖 = 𝑏−𝑗 ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝒜. The welfare differential
∆𝑊 (r𝛾,𝒜) is at maximum if and only if subsidy 𝛾𝑖 such that for firm 𝑖 ;
𝛽𝑖(G
𝑇
𝒜,−𝑎) ≥ 𝛽𝑗 ̸=𝑖(G𝑇𝒜,−𝑎),
Hence firm 𝑖 has the largest externality index.
Proof. See Appendix for proof.
8We still hold in this part that 𝒩 = 𝒜.
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This result shows the relationship between externalities on outgoing links based
on weighted interconnections and ability to improve overall welfare overall from in-
tervention related to subsidy. To summarise this point, recall that we can also write
firm 𝑖’s centrality measure as below,
𝛽𝑖(G
𝑇






This means that for every unit increase in 𝜋𝑖, it negatively impacts each
𝑟𝑗∈{𝒩 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 ∩𝒜}. Thus a negative externality. Then given that lending rates charged
by active firm serve as a form on negative externality, the subsidy should be given to
the firm who produces the least externality in the network. This is as subsidy here
increases strategic substitution since it increases the potential 𝑟𝑖 for any firm whose
𝜅(𝜇𝑖)
2 is reduced. This serves as an identifier for pressure points of our model in
contrast to other network targeting works.
A more practical and justifiable scenario would be where the Planner has limited
resource. In this instance, the Planner wishes to maximise total welfare and as
such, measures the impact of channeling subsidy to a single firm versus splitting
proportionally across all active firms. In order to select the firm to consider allocating
resource to, let us rewrite the problem of the Planner from (3.23) as follows;
max
𝛾𝑖|𝑖∈𝒜
{𝑃 𝛾𝑖𝑖 − 𝑃𝑖|𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛} , (3.27)
𝑠.𝑡 𝛾𝑖 = 𝛾𝑖|𝑖 ∈ {𝒜} 𝑎𝑛𝑑,
𝛾𝑖 ∙ 𝜅𝑖(𝜇𝑖)
2 ≤ 𝑋
It follows then that 𝛾𝑖 ≤ − 𝑋𝜅𝑖(𝜇𝑖)2 where 𝑋 represents the cash endowment of the
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regulator. In this case, we then derive another corollary from theorem 3.6.1 as,
Corollary 3.6.1. Assuming a regulator who is cash constrained and 𝑏−𝑖 = 𝑏−𝑗 ∀
𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝒜, the welfare differential ∆𝑊 𝛾𝑖(r𝛾𝑖 ,𝒜, 𝑎)|𝑖 ∈ 𝒜 is at maximum if and only if










Proof. Let 𝜂 = 2+𝑎
4𝑎
and 𝜔 = 𝑎+1
𝑎
. Since 𝛾𝑖 is not necessarily homogeneous across















and we also hold that 𝛾𝑖
1+𝛾𝑖
→ +∞ as
𝛾𝑖 → −1 while keeping active set 𝒜 strictly fixed.
The intuition then from our results is that welfare due to individual subsidy
especially when the regulator has limited funds are best allocated to firms with a
combination of greater proportional reduction in loan management expenses as well
as lower negative spillover effects. An example of the Planner making this decision
can be observed below;








Figure 3-10: Network with 3 firms and 4 debt contracts (edges)
Other parameters are as follows, 𝑎 = 0.8, 𝜅 = 0.04. This means we have 𝜋 =
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So that r* = (0.54, 0.3)𝑇 , b(G𝑇 ,−𝑎) = (0.8368, 0.5515)𝑇 and P =
(19.198, 15.553)𝑇 . Which leaves the initial welfare 1𝑇P = 34.751.
Assume then that a Planner has $2 to distribute. First we have the loan manage-
ment cost as;
𝜅(𝜇𝑖(r
*))2 = 6.35 and,
𝜅(𝜇𝑗(r
*))2 = 6.17.
We have Φ = {𝜑1, 𝜑2, 𝜑3} where 𝜑1 = {𝑖, 𝑗}, 𝜑2 = {𝑖} and 𝜑3 = {𝑗}.
For the strategy 𝜑1, 𝛾𝑖 = 𝛾𝑗 = 𝛾. This gives the value as 𝛾 = −0.1587. Strategy
𝜑2 gives 𝛾𝑖 = −0.3149 while Strategy 𝜑3 gives 𝛾𝑗 = −0.324.
Strategy 1(𝜑1): Where 𝛾 = −0.1587.
We have the welfare improvement then as;









Strategy 2(𝜑2): Where 𝛾𝑖 = −0.3149.
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The welfare improvement is;
















Strategy 3(𝜑3): Where 𝛾𝑗 = −0.324.
The welfare improvement is;
















Here, we see that the optimal intervention would be to spend the $2 on subsidising
firm 𝑖’s loan management cost which in itself, gives a total welfare improvement that
supersedes splitting proportionately among both active firms. Also noticeable, is the
fact that firm 𝑖 has a greater externality index 𝛽𝑖(G𝑇𝒜,−𝑎) in comparison to firm
𝑗 which corresponds to our results. On a final note, it is worth pointing out that
the sub-strategy combination 𝐶(|𝒜|, 𝑏), where 1 < 𝑏 < |𝒜|, strategies are known as
group strategy. This is even more distinct when the number of active firms exceeds 2
(|𝒜| > 2). Our analysis still implies the Planner weighs these strategy and indeed, the
optimal could be found within such strategy. However, we have focused primarily on
individual firms quality which makes it a suitable target. Group based intervention
remain unexplored but relevant.
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3.7 Concluding Remarks
We have shown strategic substituting behaviour of firms arising from firms making
an inter-temporal lending rate decision so as to make maximum profit in the face
of Loan management cost. Such Loan management cost depends on the level of
firms efficiency in managing overall debtors as well as creditors. The outcome of this
is a substitute game with mostly a unique equilibrium. Our best replies are very
likened to notable works such as Blume, Easley, Kleinberg, Kleinberg, and Tardos
(2011), Allouch (2015) as well as Bramoullé et al. (2014) without boundaries and
Allouch and King (2018a) with boundaries but with slightly different weight and
directional properties. We identify neutrality and welfare improving policies given
various types of intervention. One main intuition from our model is that resources can
be redirected from within and to the same firm such that the Planner improves welfare
while suffering little to no additional cost. Lastly, we established that interventions
targeted at firms who have a relatively higher degree of network centrality based on
weak link to debtors yields the most efficient welfare based outcomes. This is because
then, raising such firms lending rate yields lower negative spillover to debtor firms.
This work primarily pays more attention to cost coming from loan management
and as such gives intuition towards strategic substitute under the assumption that
the firm incurs additional cost on the basis of additional volume of loans. A possible
critique of this idea would be that to a significant degree, the number of debtors and
creditors are also key drivers of loan management cost as well and our model seems
to ignore this prospect. One reason for ignoring this is that it would mean that
firms then make decision as to how many incoming and outgoing link to establish,
which goes against our fixed network environment as we assume that such decision
are made exogenous to the model, hence the network environment we have . As
with regards to decisions on lending rates, given that there are host of other factors
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that might influence a lending rate charged, then it is easily predicted that other
forms of interaction including games of complementarity could arise if the focus is
on other factors. Also, because we assume a one-shot decision making, we ignore
instances where firms could work to increase administrative efficiency. This in itself
could lead to new problems including moral hazard (for example, a personnel might
not reveal his/her true efficiency as it might alter remuneration). We believe this
would make for a vital extension to the model. Another line of extension is linked to
welfare whereby the Planner weights firms by order of importance such that payoffs
are given weights. This could also shed a more realistic lights to impacts of policies
to firms.
3.8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3.3.1
Intuitions on this concept is briefly discussed in (Bramoullé et al., 2014). Addition-
ally, it should be noted that because G is a directed graph, then (I + 𝑎G) being
positive definite implies






hence the condition. 
Proof of Proposition 3.3.2
Given (3.8), then for the active set 𝒜, we would have for firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒜 the following;
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Intuitively, any firm 𝑙 ∈ 𝒩 −𝒜 would be such that the following holds;












𝑟𝑗 ≥ 𝜋𝑙. (3.30)
Writing (3.29) and (3.30) in vector form for the full set 𝒩 completes the proof.

Proof of Proposition 3.4.1
Holding 𝒩 = 𝒜, since our Nash equilibrium is r(G, 𝑎) = (I + 𝑎G)−1 ∙ 𝜋, we then
solve for r(G, 𝑎) below as follows;
r(G,Ω, 𝑎) =








Using block matrix inversion concept to solve for
⎡⎢⎣(I + 𝑎G(CC)) 𝑎G(CP)
𝑎G(PC) I
⎤⎥⎦,
assume without loss of generality that (I + 𝑎G(CC)) = 𝐴, 𝑎G(CP) = 𝐹 while
𝑎G(PC) = 𝐸 so that






From the Helmert-Wolf blocking inversion method,9 we have the following;
9See Wolf (1978).
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⎡⎢⎣𝐴−1 + 𝐴−1𝐹 (I− 𝐸𝐴−1𝐹 )−1𝐸𝐴−1 −𝐴−1𝐹 (I− 𝐸𝐴−1𝐹 )−1
−(I− 𝐸𝐴−1𝐹 )−1𝐸𝐴−1 (I− 𝐸𝐴−1𝐹 )−1
⎤⎥⎦









⎡⎢⎣(𝐴−1 + 𝐴−1𝐹 (I− 𝐸𝐴−1𝐹 )−1𝐸𝐴−1)𝜋𝐶𝑟 − (𝐴−1𝐹 (I− 𝐸𝐴−1𝐹 )−1)𝜋𝑃𝑟
− ((I− 𝐸𝐴−1𝐹 )−1𝐸𝐴−1)𝜋𝐶𝑟 ((I− 𝐸𝐴−1𝐹 )−1)𝜋𝑃𝑟
⎤⎥⎦
=
⎡⎢⎣𝐴−1𝜋𝐶𝑟 − 𝐴−1𝐹 (I− 𝐸𝐴−1𝐹 )−1(𝜋𝑃𝑟 − 𝐸𝐴−1𝜋𝐶𝑟)
(I− 𝐸𝐴−1𝐹 )−1(𝜋𝑃𝑟 − 𝐸𝐴−1𝜋𝐶𝑟)
⎤⎥⎦
We then focus on the first line for which we have the following expression ⇒
𝐴−1𝜋𝐶𝑟 − 𝐴−1𝐹 (I− 𝐸𝐴−1𝐹 )−1(𝜋𝑃𝑟 − 𝐸𝐴−1𝜋𝐶𝑟) = 𝐴−1(I− 𝐸𝐴−1𝐹 )−1(I− 𝐸𝐴−1𝐹 )𝜋𝐶𝑟
− 𝐴−1𝐹 (I− 𝐸𝐴−1𝐹 )−1(𝜋𝑃𝑟 − 𝐸𝐴−1𝜋𝐶𝑟)
= 𝐴−1(I− 𝐸𝐴−1𝐹 )−1𝜋𝐶𝑟
− 𝐴−1(I− 𝐸𝐴−1𝐹 )−1𝐸𝐴−1𝐹𝜋𝐶𝑟
− 𝐴−1𝐹 (I− 𝐸𝐴−1𝐹 )−1𝜋𝑃𝑟
+ 𝐴−1𝐹 (I− 𝐸𝐴−1𝐹 )−1𝐸𝐴−1𝜋𝐶𝑟
= 𝐴−1(I− 𝐸𝐴−1𝐹 )−1𝜋𝐶𝑟
− 𝐴−1𝐹 (I− 𝐸𝐴−1𝐹 )−1𝜋𝑃𝑟
= 𝐴−1(I− 𝐸𝐴−1𝐹 )−1(𝜋𝐶𝑟 − 𝐹𝜋𝑃𝑟)
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r*𝐶𝑟(G,Ω, 𝑎) = 𝐴
−1(I− 𝐸𝐴−1𝐹 )−1(𝜋𝐶𝑟 − 𝐹𝜋𝑃𝑟)
r*𝑃𝑟(G,Ω, 𝑎) = (I− 𝐸𝐴−1𝐹 )−1(𝜋𝑃𝑟 − 𝐸𝐴−1𝜋𝐶𝑟).
Since 𝐹 = 𝑎G(CP), 𝐸 = 𝑎G(PC), and (I + 𝑎G(CC)) = 𝐴 we then have the
following;
r*𝐶𝑟(G,Ω, 𝑎) = (I + 𝑎G(CC))
−1 (︀I− 𝑎G(PC)(I + 𝑎G(CC))−1𝑎G(CP))︀−1 (𝜋𝐶𝑟 − 𝑎G(CP)𝜋𝑃𝑟),
r*𝑃𝑟(G,Ω, 𝑎) =
(︀
I− 𝑎G(PC)(I + 𝑎G(CC))−1𝑎G(CP)
)︀−1
(𝜋𝑃𝑟 − 𝑎G(PC)(I + 𝑎G(CC))−1𝜋𝐶𝑟).
Since for a matrix Z, (I− 𝜃 ∙ I) ∙ Z = (1 − 𝜃) ∙ Z, we then have the following;
r*𝐶𝑟(G,Ω, 𝑎) = (I + 𝑎G(CC))
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r*𝑃𝑟(G,Ω, 𝑎) =
(︀
I− 𝑎2𝜃𝜚(I + 𝑎G(CC))−1
)︀−1















= (I + 𝑎G(CC))
(︀










I + 𝑎G(CC) − 𝑎2𝜃𝜚 ∙ I
)︀−1
((I + 𝑎G(CC))𝜋𝑃𝑟 − 𝑎𝜚 ∙ 𝜋𝐶𝑟)
=
(︀
(1 − 𝑎2𝜃𝜚) ∙ I + 𝑎G(CC)
)︀−1
((I + 𝑎G(CC))𝜋𝑃𝑟 − 𝑎𝜚 ∙ 𝜋𝐶𝑟)
=
(︀
(1 − 𝑎2𝜃𝜚) ∙ I + 𝑎G(CC)
)︀−1
(𝑎G(CC)𝜋𝑃𝑟 + 𝜋𝑃𝑟 − 𝑎𝜚 ∙ 𝜋𝐶𝑟)
=
(︀
(1 − 𝑎2𝜃𝜚) ∙ I + 𝑎G(CC)
)︀−1
(︀(︀
(1 − 𝑎2𝜃𝜚) ∙ I + 𝑎G(CC)
)︀




(1 − 𝑎2𝜃𝜚) ∙ I + 𝑎G(CC)
)︀−1
(𝑎2𝜃𝜚 ∙ 𝜋𝑃𝑟 − 𝑎𝜚 ∙ 𝜋𝐶𝑟)
+ ((1 − 𝑎2𝜃𝜚) ∙ I + 𝑎G(CC)−1
(︀





(1 − 𝑎2𝜃𝜚) ∙ I + 𝑎G(CC)
)︀−1
(𝑎𝜚(𝑎𝜃 ∙ 𝜋𝑃𝑟 − 𝜋𝐶𝑟))












Proof of Proposition 3.4.2 From proposition 3.4.1, recall we have the vector of
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Given the assumption that G(CC) ∙ 1 = 𝜌 ∙ 1 , then such regularity means that


















= (1 + 𝑎𝜌− 𝑎2𝜃𝜚)−1(𝜋𝐶𝑟 − 𝑎𝜃𝜋𝑃𝑟).
Then for the Periphery set we have;
r𝑃𝑟(G,Ω, 𝑎) = 𝜋𝑃𝑟 − 𝑎𝜚(1 + 𝑎𝜌− 𝑎2𝜃𝜚)−1(𝜋𝐶𝑟 − 𝑎𝜃𝜋𝑃𝑟)

Proof of Lemma 3.5.1




Assume 𝒩 = 𝒜. This means we can rewrite (3.4) as follows
𝑃𝑖 = 𝑏−𝑖𝑟𝑖 −
∑︁
𝑗∈𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖
𝑏𝑗𝑖𝑟𝑗 − 𝜅 ∙ (𝜇𝑖)2 (3.34)
Also, from (3.8),
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yielding;










then substituting (3.35) and (3.36) in (3.34) yields;
𝑃𝑖 = 𝑏−𝑖𝑟𝑖 −
𝑏−𝑖𝜋𝑖 + 𝑏−𝑖𝑟𝑖
𝑎







− 𝜅 ∙ (𝑏−𝑖𝜋𝑖)2








Let 𝜔 = (𝑎+1)
𝑎
and 𝜂 = 2+𝑎
4𝜅𝑎
, given (4), we have the expression with respect to firm
𝑖 ∈ 𝒜 Bonacich centrality as;
𝑃𝑖∈𝒜 = 𝜔𝑏−𝑖
(︀




In vector for, this becomes;
P𝒜 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(B) ∙
(︀
(I + 𝑎G)−1 ∙ 𝜋𝒜
)︀
−𝐾
such that 𝐾 = [𝜂]𝒜×1 and B = [𝜔 ∙ 𝑏−𝑖]𝒜×1. 
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Proof of Proposition 3.5.1
So we have that given 𝜆 = (1+𝜀), we have 𝑃 𝜀𝑖 (𝑟𝑖) = 𝜆
(︁







2 + 𝜉𝑟𝑖. If we were to take the differential with respect to 𝑟𝑖; we end up with


















This is so that rewriting in vector form, our Nash for active firms is given as;





We can simply deduce from (3.18) that the vector payoff for active firms is as
follows;








This is because granting 𝜀𝑏−𝑖 to each firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 yields equation (1) and (6). Hence
payoff is homogeneous of degree zero, i.e P𝜆𝒜(𝜆𝑏−𝑖) = P𝒜(𝑏−𝑖). As such, welfare
differential
𝑊 (r*,𝒜) −𝑊 𝜆(r𝜆,𝒜) = 1𝑇 (P𝒜 −P𝜆𝒜) = 0.

Proof of Theorem 3.5.1
Assume the Planner decides to change a firm 𝑖’s total lending by a parameter 𝜆 and
let us have it that the policy intervention 𝜆𝑖 such that payoffs is written as;
𝑃 𝜆𝑖 (𝑟𝑖) = 𝜆𝑖𝑏−𝑖 ∙ 𝑟𝑖 −
∑︁
𝑗∈𝒩 𝑖𝑛𝑖
(𝑔𝑗𝑖𝑏𝑖) 𝑟𝑗 − 𝑘
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The addition of 𝜆𝑏𝑖 to firm 𝑖 is strictly conditional on the following;



















While the equilibrium for all firm 𝑗|𝑗 ∈ 𝒩 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 ∩ 𝒜 is














where B𝜆 = (𝜔𝜆𝑖𝑏𝑖, 𝜔𝑏𝑗, 𝜔𝑏𝑘, . . .)
𝑇 , 𝜋𝜆 =
(︀







. . . 𝑔𝑛𝑖
𝜆𝑖





𝜆𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛 𝑔𝑛𝑗 . . . 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦





= 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(B) ∙ ((I + 𝑎G𝒜)
−1 ∙ 𝜋𝒜).
First we have that
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𝜔𝜆𝑖𝑏𝑖 0 . . . 0












. . . 𝑚𝑛𝑖
𝜆𝑖























𝜔𝜆𝑖𝑏−𝑖 0 . . . 0











(𝑚𝑖𝑖𝜋𝑖 +𝑚𝑗𝑖𝜋𝑗 + . . .+𝑚𝑛𝑖𝜋𝑛)
𝑚𝑖𝑗𝜋𝑖 + . . .+ . . .+𝑚𝑛𝑖𝜋𝑛
...




𝜔𝑏𝑖 (𝑚𝑖𝑖𝜋𝑖 +𝑚𝑗𝑖𝜋𝑗 + . . .+𝑚𝑛𝑖𝜋𝑛)
𝜔𝑏𝑗 (𝑚𝑖𝑗𝜋𝑖 + . . .+ . . .+𝑚𝑛𝑖𝜋𝑛)
...












































(𝑚𝑖𝑖𝜋𝑖 +𝑚𝑗𝑖𝜋𝑗 + . . .+𝑚𝑛𝑖𝜋𝑛)
1
𝜆𝑗




(𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜋𝑖 +𝑚𝑛𝑗𝜋𝑗 + . . .+𝑚𝑛𝑛𝜋𝑛)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
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
Proof of Lemma 3.5.3










While the vector payoff for active firms is then;













as such, welfare differential















While the vector payoff for active firms is then;










, 𝜋𝑗, . . .
)︁𝑇




, 𝜂, . . .
)︁𝑇
. As such, payoff vector
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differential;
P𝛾(r𝛾,𝒜) −P(r*,𝒜) = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(B) ∙
(︀
(I + 𝑎G𝒜)
−1 ∙ (𝜋𝛾𝒜 − 𝜋𝒜)
)︀
− (𝐾𝛾 + 𝐾) (3.40)




, 0, . . . , 0
)︁𝑇




, 0, . . . , 0
)︁𝑇
We can
then expand (3.40) as such;
P𝛾(r𝛾,𝒜) −P(r,𝒜) =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
𝜔𝑏−𝑖 0 . . . 0





0 0 . . . 𝜔𝑏−𝑛
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦



















𝜔𝑏−𝑖 0 . . . 0





































This then means that since 𝜋𝑖 = 12𝜅𝑏−𝑖 , we have;














This means that if 𝑏−𝑖 = 𝑏−𝑗 ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝒜, then we have that the equation above
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becomes;
∆𝑊 (r𝛾,𝒜|𝑖) = −𝛾𝜔
2𝜅(1 + 𝛾)











> 0 in so far 𝛾 < 0.
(3.42)
Observe also that −𝛾𝜔
2𝜅(1+𝛾)
as well as 𝜂𝛾
1+𝛾
is common to every active firm. This




Algorithm 1 Nash Equilibrium Lending Rate Algorithm
1: procedure Define Parameters
2: 𝒜(𝑘) ⊂ 𝒩 , 𝒩 −𝒜(𝑘) ⊂ 𝒩 , 𝒩 −𝒜(𝑘) ∩ 𝒜(𝑘) = ∅, 𝒩 −𝒜(𝑘) ∪ 𝒜(𝑘) = 𝒩 .
3: 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑘 = 2|𝒩 | − 1 (𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑝)
4: loop:
5: if 𝑘 = 1 : 1 : 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑘 then
6: r*𝒜(𝑘) = (I + 𝑎G𝒜(𝑘),𝒜(𝑘))
−1 ∙ 𝜋𝒜(𝑘).
7: r*𝒩−𝒜(𝑘) = 0.
8: End If :
9: r*𝒜(𝑘) ≥ 0 and,
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